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Fair Representation, Contract Breach and
Fiduciary Obligations: Unions, Union
Officials and the Worker in
Collective Bargaining
By SANFoiu J. RosEN*
THE NEGOTIATION of a collective bargaining agreement can be
likened to the drafting of an industrial constitution or basic statute;'

the grievance and arbitration procedures established in the agreement, to assure peaceful relations during its term, constitute a kind

of administrative process.2 These are rough analogies at best and,
although significant, the distinction between the legislative and administrative aspects of collective bargaining is not amenable to nice
recitation.2 However, if we presume in this context to speak of legislation and administration, we are immediately compelled to recognize
that which should by this day be abundantly clear-the collective
bargaining process is vitally concerned with the establishment, legiti-4
mization and continuity of systems of industrial self-government.
-A.B., 1959, Cornell University; LL.B., 1962, Yale University; Assistant Professor
of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Admitted to practice in Connecticut and
before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
' See, e.g., Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation,2 VrLL. L. REv. 151, 152 (1957);
Dunau, Employee Participationin the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50
CoLum. L. REv. 731, 732 (1950); Givins, FederalProtection of Employee Rights Within
Labor Unions, 29 Fonrums L. rEv. 259, 273 (1960); HAir & SAcKs, Tim LEi.A
Pnocxss 300 (Cambridge 10th ed. 1958), revised problem 6A (1962, on file at the
Harvard Law Library) 6-7; Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations,
68 HARv. L. PEv. 999, 1002-04 (1955); Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
or Alice Through the Looking Glass, 2 BuFALo L. REv. 1, 24 (1952); Comment, 6
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 603, 608 (1959).
2 See, e.g., Dunau, supra note 1, at 732-33; HART & SAcKS, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 300, rev. prob. at 6-7; Shulman, supra note 1, at 1007; Summers, supra note 1 at 24.
3See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957); Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945); Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup. Ct. 363, 373-77 (1964) (Goldberg, J. concurring); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal
Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1340-41 (1958).
4 See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-581
(1960); Cox, Reflections on Labor Arbitration,72 HARv. L. 1Ev. 1482, 1491-93 (1959);
Hart & Sacks, supra note 1, at 300, rev. problem at 6-7; Ku, BARGAINInG N GRmvANcE
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These private industrial governments, of course, are not unregulated
by the general community's political institutions;5 yet, within the

limitations established by law, something resembling real government does function at least in microcosm.
It is within the broad framework of collective bargaining that
the apparently conflicting interests of union and management, them7
selves petit private governments, 6 are institutionally accommodated.
Moreover, important rights to be enjoyed by the individual workers
are determined within the continuing dialogue conducted by these
power-bearing organs. 8 The principal reason, in fact, for the existence
SETTLEMENT: THE PowER OF INDUSTRIAL Wou Gnoups, 1 (1961); Shulman, supra
note 1, at 1002-03; SLICHTER, UNION POLIcIEs AND INDusTRIAL MANAGEMENT, 1 (1941);

Summers, supra note 1, at 24; Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and
Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362, 389-90 (1962); Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration,
in THE ARBIrrRATOR AND THE PARTIES, Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting,
National Academy of Arbitrators, 1, 5 (Mckelve ed., 1958); Hanslowe, On the Need for
a Political Science of Collective Bargaining, SyM1,osrum ON LAnon RELATIONS LAW 59
(Slevenko ed. 1961); Givens, Comment, Id. 76; cf. Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining
and the Concept of Contract,48 CoLum. L. REv. 829, 845-46 (1948); contra, Burstein,
Status of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 2 LAB. L.J. 902, 906 (1951). A recent
examination of the "governmental" and other somewhat different theories of collective
bargaining is to be found in Nally, The Grievance Procedure and the Supreme Court:
A Theory of Collective Bargaining, 8 VILL. L. REv. 177 (Winter 1962-63).
5 See, The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60 (Supp.
IV, 1963) [henceforth NLRA]. The Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley
Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 186-87 (Supp. IV, 1963) [henceforth LMRA]. The Railway
Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 54 Stat. 785 (1940), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63
(1958). See also, The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum Griffin
Act), 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. IV, 1963) [henceforth LMRDA].
6 See MiLian, PRrVATE Govmuqmms AND TnE CoNsTrrmoN (1959); GErHoRN,
AmmcAN Rlcorrs 163-95 (1960). See also, Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192
(1944); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Berle, Constitutional Limitations on
Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic
Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1952); Blumnrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of
Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61
MicH. L. REv. 1435 (1963); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HtAv. L. REv.
601, 626-27 (1956); Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups and
the Law, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 155 (1957); Givins, supra note 1, at 270; HAcmm, PoLITIcs
AND THE Com'oRATIoN (1958); LEISERSON, AmERICAN TRADE UNION DEmOcRACy 3-16
(1959); MInaS, WroTE CoLLAR (1951); Summers, Union Power and Worker's Rights,
49 MicII. L. REv. 805, 815-16 (1951); Wm-E, THE ORGAIZATION MAN (1956).
r See, e.g., Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocry
MT. L. REv. 247 (1958); Hofstadter and Richter, Aspects of Arbitration Under Collective
BargainingAgreements in the New York Courts, 144 N.Y.U.L.J. Nos. 57-58, p. 4, col 1
(Sept. 21-22 1960); KUHN, supra note 4; SLICHTER, supra note 4; Shulman, supra note
1; Summers, supra note 1.
8 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 1; Silver, Rights of Individual Employees in the Arbitral
Process, 12 N.Y.U. ANN. CoNr. LAB. 53, 56-57 (1959); Summers, supra note 4, Report
of the Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Employer Contracts,ABA
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of unions "is to speak for workers in negotiating terms of employment,
to exercise the collective strength of workers in obtaining concessions,
and to bind the workers by making collective contracts." 9 Functioning
as collective bargaining agencies, labor unions are thus in a position
to affect significantly the interests of the individual workers.
Nevertheless, at least before labor unions gained significant power

and stability in their relations with employers, before labor unions
were substantially incorporated into the formal power structure of

the American Establishment, the law assiduously avoided intervening to protect the individual from the organization's actions.1 0 It was

widely believed that the state should not, except in the most extreme
cases, interfere with the internal functioning of "voluntary private
associations" like trade unions." But with the growth of a complex
Section of Labor Relations Law 33, 46-47 (1954), reprinted in 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143,
158-59 (1955) [henceforth referred to as Report and cited Nw. U.L. REv.].
9 Summers, supra note 6, 49 MICH. L. REv. 806, Accord, Cox, The Role of Law in
Preserving Union Democracy, 72 Hanv. L. REv. 609-610 (1959); Note, 35 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 85, 95 (1960); see § 1 of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 449, 450, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958);
TANNENBAum & KAIIN, PARTICIPATION IN UNION LocAls 4-5 (1958); cf. Sherman, The
Individual and His Grievance-Whose Grievance Is It?, 11 U. PrIT. L. REv. 35, 36
(1949); Report, supra note 8, at 143. Professor Summers has subsequently had occasion
to elaborate upon this subject:
Collective bargaining as conceived by the statute [NLRA] vests in the
union collective power to enable it to bargain effectively with the employer, but
the purpose of giving the union that power is to benefit the employees. The
function of the collective agreement is not only to stabilize the relationship
of the collective parties, but also to establish terms and conditions of employment for the employees. Nor are the interests of the employees conceived in
narrow economic terms, for one of the dominant purposes of collective bargaining is to protect employees from arbitrary or unequal treatment-to bring
a sense of justice to the workplace. The role of the collective agreement is to
substitute general rules for unchanneled discretion; wages are not to be based
on whimsy but on established rates, layoffs are not governed by favoritism
but by seniority provisions, discharges are not based upon vindictive bias but
upon just cause found after objective inquiry.
Summers, supra note 4, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 389.
10 Recent studies commenting on the absorption of labor unions into the "American
Establishment" include: BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 211-26 (rev. Collier ed. 1961);
Form, Organized Labors Place in the Community Power Structure, 12 IND. & LAB. REL.
REv. 526 (1959); GA.LBrr=, AmERIcAN CAPITAISM: TE THEoRY OF COuNTEmVmLTHE
ING PowER (rev. ed. 1956); JAcoBs, THE STATE OF THE UNIoNs (1963); Knm,
DECLINE OF AMmuCAN PLuRALIsM 49-67 (1961); KERR, UNIONS AND UNION LEADERS
OF Thmm CHoosiNG (1957); Mmuim, supra note 6; Mras, THE PowE ELITE (1956);
Phelps, Community Recognition of Union Leaders, 7 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 419, comment and rejoinder 8 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 98 (1954); Developments in the Law,
Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HArry. L. l1Ev. 983 (1963).
11 See ibid. Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 1435-38; Chafee, Jr., The Internal Affairs
of Associations Not for Profit, 43 -{Aav. L. REv. 993 (1930); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 -ALv. L. REv. 1049, 1050-51 (1951); Note, 51 YALE L.J.
331 (1941).
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industrial society, new considerations have necessitated re-examination of the concept of and approach to such "private associations."
As Professor Blumrosen, speaking specifically of labor union development, recently observed:
Unionism emerged in the American industrial society to protect the
economic and dignitary interests of employees. The national labor
policy, developed in the 1930's, allowed employees to use their collective strength, channelled and developed through unions, to counter
the power of the employers. In this process, the power of the labor
union as an organization was enhanced. This increasing power over
the economic destiny of employees
has created problems not widely
2
envisioned a generation ago.'

In our contemporary mass society there is somewhat more of a
tendency to recognize that the power exercised by labor unions and
by many other such private associations is very like the political
power of the state insofar as the exercise of such associational power
greatly affects important interests of the subject individuals.' 3 Increasing recognition is being given to the possibility that union power
will be exercised without a proper regard for the interests of the
individual worker. 14 It is now obvious that "union power can be
exercised not only against the employer, but in cooperation with
him; not only for the employees, but against them." 15
In the light of these not unfounded fears, added attention has
been paid the question: How can the law promote such collective
union activity as is essential to "equalize the imbalance of power between employers and individuals . . . and more accurately define the

prerogatives of labor and increase their number,"' while protecting
the worker against undue disadvantages resulting from capricious
exercise of union power? As if the mere statement of the question
were not sufficient testament to the complexity of the problem, it
must be noted as well that state activity here must be advertent to
our continuing social preference for "pluralism." Briefly, the thrust
of this concept is that the state as the first among many foci of power
should not intrude so far in its necessary regulation of other power
centers as to destroy their essential independent and private characteristics. This follows from a belief that efficient social activity and
supra note 6, at 1435.
's Ibid. MILL, supra note 6; Developments in the Law, supra note 10. Comparatively early insights to this effect are to be found in Chaffee, supra note 11; Jaffee, Law
22 Blhmrosen,

Making by Private Groups, 51 HtAv. L. REv. 201 (1937).
14 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 9; JACOBS, supra note 10; KAnIEL, supra note 10; Sum-

mers, supra notes 4, 6.
'5 Blumxrosen, supra note 6, at 1435.
16 Note, 35 ST. JonN's L. REv. 85, 95 (1960). See also materials cited in note 9.
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continued individual liberty require, to the extent possible, that power
not be overly concentrated.'7
It may well be that a fully satisfactory accommodation, through
the agency of the law, of the various competing group and individual
needs incident to exercises of union power is impossible. Nevertheless a number of legal responses to the problem, or to one or another
of its phases, have been developed, and is most appropriate to continue the necessary process of examination within the context of this
symposium.
Obviously, all areas of conflict between the individual and the
union are important and all are largely interrelated.' This discussion,
however, will be primarily limited to consideration of the law's response to conflicts of union and individual interest in collective contract negotiation and administration,'" and to an examination of the

extent to which a satisfactory accommodation would be promoted by
holding labor union officials individually responsible as fiduciaries
upon the failure of a worker to receive his due from the union that
represents him.
The Duty of FairRepresentation
Various common law concepts have been pressed into service in
efforts to describe the status of individuals under the collective bar17 See, e.g., KERR, supra note 10; Developments in the Law, supra note 10, at 986-90.
Cf. HART & SAcKs, THE: LEGAL PRocEss: BAsIc PROBLEms IN T

MAMNG AND APPLICA-

TIoN or LAw (Cambridge 10th ed. 1958).
18 See Aaron, Some Aspects of the Uniors Duty of Fair Representation, 22 OErio
ST. L. REv. 39 (1961); Blumrosen, supra note 6.
19 In the collective bargaining process the tension between group and individual
needs obviously involves more than merely the relationship between the union and the
individual. Here the employer is rather directly concerned with this interplay. However,
this fact does not substantially alter the basic question that has been promulgated, i.e.,
how may the law aid in striking an appropriate balance between union power and individual interest. But cf., Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup. Ct. 363, 376-77 (Goldberg, J. concurring). As Professor Summers recently observed:
The needs of collective bargaining... inevitably look two ways-toward
the interests of the collective parties and their relationship, and toward the
interests of the employees and their individual rights. The need for an effective
union to obtain benefits and establish rules carries with it a need for individuals
to receive these benefits according to the rules. The need for the collective
parties to resolve disputes and meet changed conditions during the contract has
a concurrent need for the individual to be fairly treated according to general
rules. In framing the legal rules, the multiple needs of collective bargaining
cannot be fully served by looking only to the collective relationship; for one
of the major functions of collective bargaining may be frustrated if the employees' interest in fair and equal treatment under established rules is not given
significant weight.
Summers, supra note 4, at 390. See Blurnrosen, Legal Protectionfor CriticalJob Interests:
Union-Management Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RuTERs L. REv. 631,
651 (1959).
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gaining contract and to provide them with relief against arbitrary
applications of collective power: Employees have been described as
third party beneficiaries under the union-employer contract. 20 It has
been held that employees' contracts of hire "incorporate" terms negotiated by the union with the employer. 21 The employees have been
said to be principals and the union their agent, who negotiates the
collective agreement on their behalf. 22 And the employees have been
held to be the cestuis que trustent, owed a fiduciary duty of fair
23
representation by the union, considered to be the trustee of the trust.

None of these theories has in fact provided very extensive protection
for the individual worker and they have been criticised as reflecting
overly traditional or conceptualized approaches to the unique problems in the field of labor-management relations.2 4 "The problem presented is not [after all] one of choosing theories, for we can draw
from them only the contents which we have placed in them. The
problem is one of policy-what rights should an individual have under
a collective agreement? This problem is rooted in the need for reconciling the needs of the individual with the collective interests of the
union and management." 25 Nevertheless, these theories, and particu-

larly the last two, embodying fiduciary concepts and stating a policy
20 See, J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 336 (1944); Springer v. Powder
Power Tool Corp., 220 Ore. 102, 108-09, 348 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1960); Falsetti v. Local
No. 2026, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960); Howlett, Contract Rights of the Individual
as Against the Employer, 8 LAB. L.J. 316, 319 n.16 (1957); Jaeger, Collective Labor
Agreements and the Third Party Beneficiary, 1 B.C. IND. & Com. L. 11Ev. 125 (1960).
21 See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 210
F.2d 623, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1954), aff'd, 348 U.S. 437 (1955); Rentschler v. Missouri
Pacific R.R., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934) (and cases discussed therein); Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495, 499, 82 N.W.2d 172, 174 (1957).
22 See Mueller v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 194 Minn. 83, 259 N.W. 798 (1935); Howlett, supra note 20, materials cited at 320 n.16; Summers, Collective Power and Individual
Rights in the Collective Agreement-A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72
YALE L.J. 421, 431 (1963).
23
See Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191 (4th Cir.
1963); Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959), aft'd, 273
F.2d 614 (1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960); Falsetti v. Local 2026, 400 Pa.
145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960); Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132
(1959), rehearing denied, 8 Wis. 2d 264, 100 N.W.2d 317 (1960), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 962 (1960); Cox, supra note 6, at 638-39; Gregory, Fiduciary Standards and the
Bargainingand Grievance Process,8 LAB. L.J. 843 (1957); Hanslowe, Individual Rights
in Collective Labor Relations, 45 Coum;EL L.Q. 25, 44 (1959); Isaacson, Labor Arbitration in State Courts, 12 AnB. J. 179, 189-90 (1957); Report of the Committee on
Labor Arbitration, ABA Section of Labor Relations Law 55, 75-76 (1957).
24 Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup Ct. 363, 376 (1964) (Goldberg, J. concurring);
Cox, supra note 6, at 604-05; Lenhoff, The Effects of Labor Arbitration Clauses Upon
the Individual, 9 Anm. J. 3, 4 (1954); Note, 66 YAILE L.J. 946, 951 (1957).
25 Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary Analysis,
9 BrFFAxo L. R1Ev. 239, 240-41 (1960).
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preference for "fair representation," have, over the past couple of
decades, provided considerable attraction for judges and commentators alike. Judicial use of these theories is made, however, with
increased recognition that these familiar legal concepts can only be
applied with a generous appreciation of the unique realities and needs
2
of the labor relations field. 6
The first significant case involving the duty of fair representation
was Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.2 7 At issue was the power
of a union to negotiate, with an employer, an agreement that had as
its conspicuous purpose and consequence first the limitation and then
the destruction of the employment opportunities of the Negroes represented by that union. The Supreme Court declared the contract
to be unlawful. Building upon the federal statutory authority of the
union to act as the exclusive bargaining representative for all the
workers in the bargaining unit, the Court held that:
Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with
powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to
create and to restrict the rights of those whom it represents .. but
it has also imposed on the representative a corresponding duty ...
to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those
for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them. 28
As initially formulated by the Supreme Court, the duty of fair
representation only protected workers subject to the Railway Labor
Act from racial discrimination on the part of the union actually representing them and the protection applied only to the negotiation
and drafting of the written collective bargaining agreement. 29 In time,
however, the protection was extended. At present workers subject
to the Labor Management Relations Act are also protected.3o And
28

E.g., Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191, 201 (4th
Cir. 1963); see United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); cf. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
2T323 U.S. 192 (1944).
28323 U.S. 202-03. Congress had not explicitly imposed such a duty. The Court,
rather, found this requirement in the statute in order to avoid deciding the question
whether, in view of the delegation of statutory authority, unions must constitutionally
avoid "hostile discrimination." See Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup. Ct. 363, 375 (Goldberg,
J. concurring).
29 From the very beginning, actions for breach of the duty could be brought either
in state court, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, reversing 245 Ala. 113,
16 So. 2d 416 (1944), or in federal court, Turnstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, reversing 140 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1944). The action can be one for
damages or injunctive relief, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. supra at 207, and
the employer can be joined as a party. See id. at 203-04; Cunningham v. Erie R.R., 266
F.2d 411, 416 (2d Cir. 1959).
30 See Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup. Ct. 363; Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350
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in some circumstances a union owes a duty of fair representation to
workers for whom it does not actually function as collective bargaining agent.3 1 Moreover, the duty must be met not only when the
collective agreement is negotiated and written, but also when the
agreement is administered through grievance proceedings and the
33
like. 32 Finally, after initial hesitation by the lower federal courts,
it is now clear that all invidious discriminations, not merely the racial
4
variety, are prohibited
The federal duty unquestionably is like a fiduciary obligation.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in an
opinion examining many of the significant decisions and articles on
the subject, recently stated:
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly characterized this
obligation by the very term "fiduciary relationship," its treatment of
the subject is tantamount thereto. It has in fact said that "Bargaining agents who enjoy the advantages of the Railway Labor Act's provisions must execute their trust without lawless invasions of the rights
of other workers." While it is not always appropriate to transplant
common law concepts to the field of labor relations, it is plain that
in the Supreme Court's view the federal statutory duty of fair representation is not unlike a common law fiduciary obligation.To the same effect are major state court decisions examining the state
common law or statutory duties of fair representation as well as the
federal requirement. 6
U.S. 892; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330; Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound
Lines, 303 F.2d 182, 185 (9th Cir. 1962); cert. denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962); Durandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 195 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Mich. 1961); Berman v. National Maritime Union, 166 F. Supp. 327, 331-332 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
31 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768. Compare the interpretation of Howard made in Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R., 55 L.R.R.M. 2603, 2605
(4th Cir., March 2, 1964) with that made in Summers, supra note 22, at 432.
32 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup. Ct 363
(1964); Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191, 197-98 nn.11
& 12 (4th Cir. 1963).
33 See, e.g., Alabough v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 222 F.2d 861, 866-67 (4th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 839 (1955).
34 Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup. Ct. 363; Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
Porters, 316 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1963), overruling Alabaugh, supra note 32; see cited
sources in Thompson, 316 F.2d 198 n.15.
35 Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, supra note 34, 316 F.2d
at 201 (emphasis added) (discussing relevant Supreme Court statements). See Gregory,
Fiduciary Standardsand the Bargainingand Grievance Process, 8 Lab. L.J., 843 (1957).
a6Jenkins v. William Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 564-65, 574-75,
144 A.2d 88, 93, 98-99 (1958); Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d
132 (1959), rehearingdenied, 8 Wis. 2d 264, 100 N.W.2d 317 (1960), cert denied, 362
U.S. 962 (1960); Falsetti v. Local No. 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 171-72, 161 A.2d 882,
895-96 (1960). See Cox, supra note 6 at 645-46, 652; Cox, Individual Enforcement of
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While it is now clear that labor unions, and consequently union
officers and officials, owe those whom they represent a fiduciary duty
of fair representation, unfortunately the protection afforded is less
3
real than apparent.

7

Initially, there are limitations inherent in the judicial character
of the protection. To gain relief an expensive law suit must be conducted-this is usually out of the question for all but especially outraged workers.38 Such a law suit, in addition, is likely to be so time
consuming as to dissipate real enjoyment of the fruits of any ultimate
victory.8 9 In addition, a number of courts have compounded the general limitations incident to the judicial character of the remedy by
imposing "numerous procedural and technical barriers which tend to
restrict effective protection of employees."40 The effect of these limiCollective BargainingAgreements, 8 LAB. L.J. 850, 853-54 (1957).
The extent to which state law remains relevant in cases involving individual rights
in collective bargaining appears to be decreasing, for the Supreme Court has taken steps
moving far in the direction of pre-emption of the field by federal substantive law. State
law is clearly pre-empted at least when the individual is able to bring a suit for breach
of the collective bargaining agreement and it is probably pre-empted, as well, whenever
a fair representation claim is raised. See Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup. Ct. 363 (1964)
(to be discussed at length, infra); Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,
supra note 34, at 199; Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963);
compare Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, supra, with Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 55
LRRM 2552 (W.D. Pa., Feb. 27, 1964); see Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 1519-20;
Summers, supra note 4, at 370-75.
37 See generally, Aaron, supra note 18, at 40; Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 1470-71;
Cray, The Individual Worker and the Right to Arbitrate, 12 LAB. L.J. 816 (1961); Summers, supra note 25, at 244-48; Report, supra note 8, at 161; Note, 13 STAN. L. REv.
161, 164 (1960).
38 This difficulty might be overcome if the National Labor Relations Board were
found to be empowered to enforce the duty of fair representation. See Blunarosen, supra
note 6, at 1504-22; Cox, supra note 1, at 172-75; Sovern, The National Labor Relations
Act and Racial Discrimination,62 CoLum. L. Buv. 563 (1962); Note, 112 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 711 (1964). But the second circuit has rejected such an approach, NLRB v.
Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (denying enforcement of 140 N.L.R.B.
No. 7 (1962)); but see Durandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 195 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Mich.
1961), and the Supreme Court has not yet passed upon the question. Humphrey v.
Moore, 84 Sup. Ct. 363, 369 (1964).
3
9In Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, supra note 34, 316 F.2d
192 n.1, the court stated: "We note the unhappy fact that the litigation was begun
more than four years ago, a circumstance for which the District Judge who tried the
case was in no way responsible .. "
40 Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 1471. Professor Blumrosen commented further that
courts "have insisted on technicalities of pleading [n.93: e.g., Hardcastle v. Western
Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962); Wilson
v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 368 Mich. 61, 117 N.W.2d 184 (1962); Carlini v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 71 N.J. Super. 101, 176 A.2d 266 (App. Div. 1961), cert. denied, 37 N.J. 133,
179 A.2d 569 (1962)], have applied doctrines restricting the suability of unions, have
imposed an exhaustion of contract remedies requirement where such remedies seem
unavailable [n.95: See Widuk v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 367, 369, 117 N.W.2d
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tations is quite significant. A commentator who communicated with
the attorneys of record, in the reported fair representation cases involving alleged racial discrimination, as to the present status or ultimate disposition of each case has concluded that:
In theory, the doctrine of fair representation assures Negroes that
their jobs cannot be affected by unfairness on the part of their collective bargaining representatives. In fact, Negro workers have made
extremely limited use of judicial coercion under the Steele standard;
and when they have tried to take advantage of its apparent protection,
41
they have secured only slight practical amelioration of their position.
In non-racial cases, effective use of the judicial protection appears
to be even more limited. As already noted, some courts were initially
reluctant to extend the duty to cases other than those involving racial
affronts. By now, however, it is clear that the obligation does extend
to non-racial abuses of union power. 42 Yet, in only a very few cases
have aggrieved parties won court decisions on the merits when unfair
representation of a non-racial origin has been alleged. 43
245, 247 (1962); Larson v. American Airlines, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
aff'd, 313 F.2d 599 (2d Cir., 1963)], and have hesitated to allow the employee to protect his interest in arbitration [n.96: In re Soto, 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 855, 198
N.Y.S.2d 282 (1960)]." But see Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,
supra note 34 (where counsel did such a poor job that at one point the court commented
" 316 F.2d 197 n.8. Nevertheless,
bitterly that "the thing has been poorly handled ..
reading the pleadings very liberally, the court held that a proper cause of action had
been stated and remanded the case for trial on the merits). See also Ferro v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir., 1961); Nobile v. Woodward, 200 F. Supp.
785 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 55 L.R.R.M. 2552 (W.D. Pa. Feb.
27, 1964); Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Con, 502, 58 A.2d 729 (1948); Rumbaugh v. Winifred R.R., 55 L.R.R.M. 2603, supra note 31.
It is noteworthy that preclusion of punitive damages may be another limitation
imposed by the courts on the duty. See Brady v. TWA, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 504 (D. Del.
1961); Thompson, supra note 34, at 203.
4
1 Herring, The Doctrine of FairRepresentation in the Hands of the Courts and the
National Labor Relations Board, Unpublished Divisional Paper Yale Law School (1963)
on file at the Yale Law Library-Anticipated to be published in the Maryland Law
Review.
42 See notes 33 & 34 supra.
43 Notable examples of cases in which breaches of duty have ultimately been found
include: Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., supra note 36; Wilson v. Hacker, 200 Misc. 124,
101 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1950); Moore v. Local 89, Teamsters, 356 S.W.2d
241 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963), reversed sub. nom., Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup. Ct. 363

(1964).
If the other theories upon which individual relief can be based are included, e.g.,
individual suits for breach of contract or to compel participation in grievance and arbitration proceedings, the incidence of success would appear to be somewhat greater. See
generally Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37
N.Y.U.L. REv. 362 (1962). A fully comprehensive approach to the group-individual
conflicts in at least the administrative phase of collective bargaining would examine all
the ways in which the individual might seek judicial redress of his grievances. See, e.g.,
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The judicial tendency to circumscribe availability of the remedy
and the reluctance to extend the duty to prohibit non-racial injuries
reflects a continuation of the general judicial attitude against intervention in the sphere of private associational power and organization.
Criticism has been leveled at the courts for being unwilling "to discard the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of 'voluntary' organizations" even in applying the explicit statutory protection
of Title I, "The Bill of Rights" provisions, of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.:4 Regardless of how inappropriate it may be for the courts to pursue only faintly this explicit
legislative program to protect and promote internal union democracy,
in the realm of collective bargaining, judicial reluctance to intrude
deeply into the process of contract formation, through the judicially
created entry of fair representation, is not altogether unwise.
In situations other than those involving necessary constitutional
determinations, it is normally the responsibility of the legislature to
determine, at least in the first instance, such important social policies
as the extent to which and the manner in which private institutions
and associations should be regulated by governmental agencies. 45
And it is clear that Congress has chosen to promote collective bargaining as a system of "private ordering." 46 The theory of government
regulation here is not generally to prescribe in detail the manner of
agreements the parties will make, but rather to require only that the
parties conscientiously seek their own agreements, 47 subject to some
Summers' discussion of the New York and Wisconsin cases, id. at 363-70; Blumrosen, The
Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the
Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1435, 1482-501 (1963). Hanslowe, The
Collective Agreement and the Duty of Fair Representation, 14 LAB. L.J. 1052 (1963).
Some consideration of other legal constructs for the protection of individuals will be
undertaken infra.
-473 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (Supp. IV, 1963). See Rosenberg, Interpretive Problemsof Title 1 of the Labor-ManagementReporting and DisclosureAct, 16
IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 405 (1963). Compare Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.
1963), reversing, 203 F. Supp. 288 (D. Md. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963),
with Johnson v. Nelson, 212 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir.
Dec. 31, 1963).
45See generally BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SupnEum CouwT AT
nns BAR OF PoLrncs (1962).
46The specific term "private ordering" comes from HAT & SACKS, THE LEGAL
PsocEss (Cambridge 10th ed. 1958). Their examination of its relevance to collective
bargaining is to be found at 292-93, 298-301, revised problem 6A (1962, on file at the
Harvard Law Library) 2-7. See also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
47
See §8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958); Duvin, The Duty
to Bargain in Good Faith: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLum. L. 11Ev. 248 (1964);
Fleming, The Obligation to Bargainin Good Faith, 47 VA. L. B1Ev. 988 (1961); Welling-
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legal prohibitions.48 This is somewhat in contrast to the thrust of the
LMRDA where, to foster internal union democracy, Congress has
superimposed detailed legislative strictures upon union structure and
behavior.49 Unlike such a legislative program, the duty of fair representation was formulated as a judicial generality, erected upon
presumed legislative intent, in order to avoid a hard constitutional
question. 50 By it the courts did not presume, nor should they for
Congress would seem to have rejected such a program, generally and
closely to supervise substantive collective bargaining decisions made
in the course of drafting the contract. So far as consideration of the
merits of collective bargaining decisions is concerned, at least when
not yet presented with standards established by the parties themselves, the courts quite properly have sought only to render free from
gross abuse of the worker the system of essentially private ordering
that Congress has undertaken to promote.
When applied to test the substance or merits of collective bargaining decisions, in fact, all the duty of fair representation demands is
that unions avoid "hostile discrimination," "invidious" discrimination,
or "discrimination not based on . . . relevant differences." 51 The

Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the subject is that this
means that a union does not breach its "duty in taking a good faith
position contrary to some individuals whom it represents nor in
supporting the position of one group of individuals against that of
another."52 At least until there is an actual collective bargaining
agreement from which more precise standards can be drawn, this
means that the courts are in a position only to remedy such abuses
of power as are particularly gross for "Inevitably differences arise
in the manner and degree to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees or classes of employees. The mere
existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The comton, Freedom, Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 14 LAB. L.J. 1016
(1963); 112 U. OF PA. L. REv. 467 (1964).
48 See § 8, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1958), as amended, 73 Stat. 525, 542, 545 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. IV, 1963).
49 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. IV, 1963); see, e.g., Aaron,
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 851
(1960); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959,
58 MicHr. L. Rvgv. 819 (1960); Summers, American Legislationfor Union Democracy, 25
MODERN L. REv. 273 (1962).
50 See note 28 supra.

51 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
52 Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup. Ct. 363, 371 (1964); see Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944);
Britt v. Trailmobile Co., 179 F.2d 569 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950).
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plete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected." 3
Particularly at the contract negotiation stage, the scope of judicial
review is thus exceedingly narrow, for in negotiating the agreement,
even one of a series of agreements, unions and management are concerned with the formulation of the broad outline of the system of
peaceful self-government. 54 In making its demands here, the union

is almost invariably faced with the necessity of choosing among apparently legitimate but competing interests of different groups of
workers. To assure optimal gain for all employees represented by the

union, the union must be able to bargain from a position of virtually
absolute strength, unattended at this bargaining table by dissent from
those who it represents. 55 Furthermore, until the basic agreement is
established by the collective parties, a reviewing court is only in a
position to examine a negotiation decision for conformity to relatively

abstract and nebulous standards of fairness.56 The result is that, in
the application of the duty at this stage, absent an actual demonstra-

tion of bad faith, bad faith cannot be inferred from classifications
drawn in the agreement unless they are "invidious" in the sense that

they are not based upon lawful distinctions. According to a recent
Second Circuit decision, this means that if "a bargaining agent in representing the employees [were] to draw distinctions among them
which are based upon their political power within the union,",5 the
bargaining agent would be in violation of its duty. In other words,
in seeking to resolve conflicts, the union cannot rely upon the political
element but must base its decision on more "rational standards."58
But the complaining party has the burden of demonstrating that
Ibid. In Steele, supra note 51, the Court further stated that the union's obligation
does not mean that the statutory representative of a craft is barred from making
contracts which may have unfavorable effects on some of the members of the
craft represented. Variations in the terms of the contract based on differences
relevant to the authorized purposes of the contract in conditions to which they
are to be applied, such as differences in seniority, the type of work performed,
the competence and skill with which it is performed, are within the scope of a
bargaining representative of a craft, all of whose members are not identical
in their interest or merit.
323 U.S. 203.
54 See notes 1-7 supra with text; notes 71-73 infra with text.
55 Cf. Report, supra note 8, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143, 150 (1955); Sherman, The
Individual and His Grievance-Whose Grievance Is It?, 11 U. Prrr. L. Rzv. 35, 35-37
(1949).
50 On the diffculty of finding appropriate standards see Cox, The Duty of Fair
Representation, 2 Vr.L. L. REv. 151, 166-69 (1957); Wellington, Union Democracy
and Fair Representation: FederalResponsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE LJ. 1327,
1339-43 (1958); Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 490 (1952); Note, 62 YALE L.J. 282 (1953).
57 Ferro v. Railway Express Co., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961).
5SBlumrosen, supra note 43, at 1480.
53
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the union was improperly activated politically or was otherwise acting
in bad faith or engaging in invidious discrimination, for at least when
allegations of unfair representation at this stage are made, the union
normally must merely show some proper reason for acting or some

"reasonable" criterion for the classification that was drawn."9 And, it
is seldom difficult for unions or the courts to find some apparently
legitimate reason to justify almost any classification or action.60 Therefore, unless the classification is obviously based upon palpably unlawful criteria, such as race or, absent a valid union shop agreement,
non-membership in the union, 6 1 the courts will rarely be in a position

to conclude on the merits that the negotiated provision is invalid.
Once apparently legitimate reasons for the union's action are presented, the individual must then demonstrate that these reasons were
pretextuous in order to prevail.6 2 Rarely will the union act in such
a manner as to make available to the aggrieved individual evidence
that its presumably valid reasons are mere pretext.
59 Professor Wellington has critically described the judicial approach:
A heavy presumption of regularity, not unlike the presumption of constitutionality which quite properly attaches to judicial review of state economic
action, is employed in court hearings on union action. This imposes a strenuous burden of proof on a plaintiff....
Steele fails because courts, unable to find standards by which to test the
fairness of economic distinctions in collective agreements, apply a heavy presumption of legality to union action. This is similar to the presumption of constitutionality federal courts accord to state action in the economic sphere-a
presumption rooted in an altogether different relationship.
Wellington, supra note 56, at 1341-42, 1357.
See Report, supra note 8, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143, 158 (1955); Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 177 F. Supp. 421, 430-31 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (dictum), aff'd, 275 F.2d
342 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 811 (1960) ("The discrimination cases seem
to be of two classes: a larger group which concerns racial discrimination-then a much
smaller category comprising instances of arbitrary and capricious action within the union,
in defiance of that union's own internal procedures. An overt, hostile and invidious discrimination must be demonstrated in order to raise such a ground").
60 See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra note 52 (discrimination in favor of military
veterans upheld); Britt v. Trailmobile Co., supra note 52 (same); Whiteford v. United
Steelworkers, Local 2708, 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902
(1959) (apparent racial discrimination justified); cf. Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., 349
Mich. 108, 84 N.W.2d 523 (1957) (disparity of treatment based upon sex affirmed);
see also Wellington, supra note 56, at 1342 n.77.
61 See Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, supra note 34, 316 F.2d
at 198-99; Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 58 A.2d 729 (1948).
62 See Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, supra notes 34 & 61. The
court was impressed by the fact that a union official explicitly wrote that "there was
nothing I could do until you became a full fledged member .... " 316 F.2d at 195.
The Court was further impressed by the fact that the union had failed to explain why
its "reasons" for not acting on plaintiff's behalf had not stopped it from acting on behalf
of other, similarly situated, employees. 316 F.2d at 195-96.
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After a collective agreement has actually been drafted, conditions
for judicial review of union bargaining decisions are somewhat altered.
The parties have themselves established a visible structure for their
system of private ordering; they have established "standard[s] which
both sides have agreed [are] the norm[s] in relation to which a dispute is to be settled,"G3 and which are suitable for judicial scrutiny.
Thus, once an agreement has been adopted, it becomes possible for
a reviewing court to judge union actions in administering it not only
by vague external standards of fairness but also according to the contract terms or according to what the individual's reasonable expectations are under those terms. "The function of the collective agreement
is," after all, "not only to stabilize the relationship of the collective

parties, but also to establish terms and conditions of employment for
the employees." 6 4 Workers, consequently, attach great importance to
the grievance procedure, for it is at this stage of collective bargaining
that the individual has the greatest tangible interest.0 5 The determina-

tion of a grievance is likely to have a visibly direct, immediate and
personal affect upon the individual.6 6 Depending upon the outcome,
he may retain or lose his job, be promoted or passed over, gain or

lose money, be disciplined or exonerated. Furthermore, since the
grievance procedure is concerned more with particular claims than

with the statement of general rules and classifications, "The grievance
procedure is particularly susceptible to abuse, for through it individuals or groups may be singled out [more easily] for arbitrary treatment."(1 Thus, not only is there more need here for review external
63

Dunau, Participationin the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining,50 COLUM.
L. REv. 731, 733 (1950); see Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A
PreliminaryAnalysis, 9 B=rFALo L. REv. 239, 245 (1960).
64 Summers, supra note 43, at 389. Professor Summers is quoted further supra,
notes 9 & 19; see notes 9 & 19 supra; see also Blumrosen, supra note 43, at 1475-77;
SLICnrEn, UNION POLICIES AN

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT (1941).

65

PUrCELL, BLUE COLLAR: PATrEnNs OF DuAL ALLEGCLNCE IN INDusTRY 200-09
(1960); see Kums, BARcGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT: THE PoWER OF INDUSTRIAL

WORK GRoUPs 22 (1961); Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68
I-ARv. L. REV. 999, 1022 (1955).
"A 'grievance' in the language of labor relations is an assertion of a claim under the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement." Gray, The Individual Worker and the
Right to Arbitrate, 12 LAB. L.J. 816, 817 (1961). For other definitions see Dunau, supra
note 63, at 736; Rose, The Nature of a Grievance in Labor Relations, 3 LAB. L.J. 599
(1952); SLiCarm, et al., THE INAcT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT,
693-96 (1960).
66 See Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 LAB.
L.J. 850, 854 (1957); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAIv. L. REv. 601, 615
(1956); Rose, supra note 64; Note, 25 BRoo LYN L. REv. 332, 338 (1959).
67
Summers, supra note 43, at 393. Professor Summers also indicated, id. at 393-94,
other ways in which grievance processing differs from contract negotiation:

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15

to the union but where the collective agreement is reasonably explicit
about wages, seniority and other benefits or conditions of employment,
a reviewing court is in a position to determine not only whether a
union has been fair according to external standards, but also whether
the individual has been given his due under the contract. While protection of individual interests might be promoted pursuant to the fiduciary duty of fair representation, resort might also be made to contract
suits, against union and employer as equal parties, for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement. 68
It is not inappropriate to suggest that until the collective agreement has been drafted, establishing somewhat precise or specific
standards, all the courts can hope to do in reviewing union bargaining decisions is to apply a test analogous to that used to determine
whether a statute violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, i.e., are the classifications that are established reasonable
or non-invidious. When, one the other hand, it is claimed that a bargaining decision, made in the course of administering the contract,
violated the requirement of fair representation, courts may be in a
position to consider as well whether the grievant has been denied
"due process of law" under the contract, i.e., that which he 69might
appropriately expect to accrue to him under the contract itself.
The individual's interest may more often be vitiated without vindictiveness or deliberate discrimination. Incomplete investigation of the facts, reliance
on untested evidence, or colored evaluation of witnesses may lead the union to
reject grievances which more objective inquiry would prove meritorious. Union
officials burdened with institutional concerns may be willing to barter unrelated
grievances or accept wholesale settlements if the total package is advantageous,
even though some good grievances are lost. Concern for collective interests
and the needs of the enterprise may dull the sense of personal justice....
Although the frequence of unfairness in grievance handling is impossible
to measure, there is no doubt that the danger to the individual can be substantial. Within union groups cliques are not uncommon, political rivalries are often
sharp and factional fights are bitter. Refusal to process grievances or "botching"
them is a subtle but effective weapon. Seniority grievances are vulnerable to
group pressures, and "horse-trading" of grievances can become commonplace.
See also, Cox, supra, note 66, 8 LAB. L.J. 854; Dunau, supra note 63, at 759; Fleming,
Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L.
Re~v. 235 (1961); KulN, supra note 65; Sherman, supra note 55, at 49; Summers, supra
note 25, at 245; Report, supra note 8, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 143, 153-56; Comment, 6
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 603, 628 (1959).
68 See Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup. Ct. 363 (1964); Summers, supra note 43, at
370-75.
69 Cf. Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the Looking
Glass, 2 Bur . o L. Rev. 1, 24-25 (1952); but cf. Wellington, supra note 56, at 1340-42,
1357, quoted in part supra note 59.
Obviously, formal contract negotiation cannot refer only to the negotiation of the
very first agreement between the collective parties. That is the worker cannot be permitted to claim that all his rights become fully "vested" and fixed to the extent that
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To the extent that this distinction between contract negotiation
and administration is valid, justified criticism has been leveled at the
courts for tending to extend in full the principle of broad union discretion, initially formulated in cases involving formal contract negotiation and amendment, to review of union decisions made in the course
of contract administration.

70

There are, however, substantial considerations that support the
view that union discretion should be essentially as broad when administering the contract as during the contract drafting stages. This proposition is founded upon the basic and unassailable premise that "The
grievance procedure is ...a part of the continuous collective bargaining process."71 More specifically, this view proceeds from a recog-

nition that the complexity of the continuing relationship to be governed
by the collective agreement necessitates that, by comparison, the agreement itself be relatively uncomplicated-dealing explicitly with only
some of the most significant and difficult problems existing at the time
of its drafting. 72 As Justice Goldberg wrote, while still the Secretary
of Labor,
In negotiating contracts the parties have reached large areas of
mutual agreement long before the first bargaining session is convened.
At the same time, in the administration of an agreement, it is an
obvious oversimplification to assert that the contract contains the
parties' agreement on the many issues that are brought to arbitration [or are raised in the prior stages of the grievance process]. The
they cannot be limited even by formal negotiation of a new agreement or by formal
amendment of the old. The question has never been whether the collective parties could
change the individual's status, but when and how. The collective agreement is never
contemplated to last more than a few years. And when each new agreement is formally
negotiated, the individual's legal protection can essentially be no greater than it was
during the negotiation of the old agreement. The place for a different scope of legal protection is in the grievance process--the administrative as opposed to legislative drafting
phase. See Summers, supra note 43, at 396-97, quoted infra note 124.
70 See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 43, at 1470; Gray, supra note 37; Howlett, Contract Rights of Individual Employees as Against the Employer, 8 LAB.L.J. 316 (1957);
Lenhoff, The Effects of Labor Arbitration Clauses Upon the Individual, 9 AnB. J. 3
(1954); Report, supra note 8, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143 (1955); Sherman, supra note 55;
Summers, supra note 43; Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary Analysis, 9 BuFFALo L. REv. 239 (1960); but see Cox, supra note 67, 69 HAav.
L. REv. 622-652 (1956).
71 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960);
see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
72 See Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RocKY MT.
L. REV. 247, 262-63 (1958); Kotin, Labor Agreements in Collective Bargaining,6 N.Y.U.
ANN. CoNF. LAB. 1, 3 (1953); Shulman, Reason, Contract,and Law in Labor Relations,
68 HAsv. L. REV. 999, 104 (1955); Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or
Alice Through the Looking Glass, 2 Bus'Aro L. RFv. 1, 14-15 (1952); Note, 13 STAN.
L. REv. 161, 166 (1960).
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collective bargaining process is not so abrupt that all is disagreement
before the contract and all agreement thereafter. Both agreement
and disagreement concerning the relationships between the parties
exist before and after the contract is signed. Not all issues are resolved by the contract, for the parties may over-generalize issues,
realizing 73that a contract is more essential than the solution of every
problem.
Consequently, although the typical collective agreement will contain
some provisions announcing somewhat explicit rules to govern some
aspects of the union-management-employee relationship, in large measure the agreement will be composed of broad standards that must
undergo future interpretation. In this respect, the agreement is like
an organic law or a constitution that does not presume to terminate
collective bargaining; rather, the agreement is a sub silentio anticipation of the continuation of bargaining, normally within the procedures
and processes, however, that it provides.
In the course of this continued process of bargaining, the union
will, just as prior to the drafting of the basic contract, find it necessary
to resolve legitimate conflicts between the interests of different individuals and groups that it represents. 74 Obviously, the moving grievants
will not be the only persons concerned with the grievances that are to
be processed. 75 The individual's interest appears to be most direct
when the grievance to be processed is his own. However, an individual
may have a very direct interest in the grievances of other workers.
If the grievant is not laid off, the other individual may be laid off
instead; if the grievant gains seniority, the other worker's seniority
may suffer. 76 Even the determination of a wage, vacation or disciplinary dispute may have an affect on others than the named grievants,
for the disposition of the grievance could be used77 as a quasi-precedent
for the resolution of similar claims in the future.
7 Goldberg, Labor Arbitration-A Symposium-Introduction, 37 N.Y.U.L. BElv.
359, 360 (1962). See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra
note 71, at 578-582; Shulman, The Role of Arbitration in the Collective Bargaining
Process, (Unpublished paper used in Harvard Business School, quoted in Cox, supra
note 72, at 262).
74See Cox, e.g., supra note 67, at 615-16; Note, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 85, 95
(1960).
7 See, e.g., Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959),
rehearing denied, 8 Wis. 2d 264, 100 N.W.2d 317 (1960), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962
(1960); Cox, supra note 67, at 615; Summers, supra note 43, at 363-70, 393-95.
76See Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., supra note 75; Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup.
Ct. 363 (1964); Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor
Arbitration,13 ST-,. L. REv. 235, 237 (1961); Report, supra note 8, 50 Nw. U.L. REV.
143, 153-54 (1955); Note, 46 VA. L. REv. 802, 806 (1960); Note, 66 YALE L.J. 946,
951-52 (1957).
77 Cox, supra note 67, at 612, 615; Report, supra note 8, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 143,
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Once it is recognized that substantial collective bargaining must
continue even after the contract has been negotiated and drafted, it
is not too difficult to become more concerned with the collective as
opposed to the individual interest in grievance proceedings and consequently to conclude that the bargaining agent's discretion should
be essentially as broad when administering the contract as when negotiating it. Professor Summers has suggested that,
[Tlhree uses of the grievance procedure in managing the collective
relationship are particularly relevant in defining individual rights.
First, the grievance procedure is used to complete the collective
agreement. .

.

. Second, the grievance procedure may be used to

change the collective agreement and serve the needs of flexibility....
Third, the grievance procedure 8may be used as a clearing house for
balancing off unrelated claims.7
None of these uses could be said to be objectively improper in the
sense of being corrupt, fraudulent or invidiously discriminatory. Consequently, if the focus of social concern were almost exclusively on
the collective interest and managing the collective enterprise, invasion
of individuals" interests could almost always be justified by each such
use of the grievance procedure. It would follow from this that the
duty of fair representation and the application of other theories of
individual protection should at the administrative stage be limited
to prohibition only of gross abuses of discretion or invidious discrimination as at the negotiation stage. The Supreme Court, in Humphrey
v. Moore,7 9 its latest pronouncement on the duty of fair representation
and related matters, however, would appear, in theory at least and
over Justice Goldberg's earnest objection, to have accepted rather the
view that the legal protection afforded the individual differs significantly from the contract drafting to the contract administration stage.
Humphrey v. Moore: FairRepresentation and
Suits for Breach of Contract
In the Humphrey case, the question was "whether the Kentucky
Court of Appeals properly enjoined implementation of the decision
of a joint employer-employee [union] committee purporting to settle

certain grievances in accordance with the terms of a collective bargain155, 179 (1955); cf. Jones, Labor Arbitration and Stare Decisis: Some Introductory
Remarks, 4 U.C.L.A.L. R1Ev. 657 (1957); Roberts, Precedent and Procedure in Arbitration Cases, 6 N.Y.U. ANN. CoNF. LAB. 149, 159-60 (1953); Shulman, supra note 72, at
1020; Comment, 6 U.C.L.A.L. Ev. 603, 635, 637 (1959); Note, 35 ST. JoHN's L. 1 Ev.

85, 95 (1960).
78

Summers, supra note 43, at 390-91.
79 84 Sup. Ct. 363 (1964), reversing Moore v. Local 89, Teamsters, 356 S.W.2d
241 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963).
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ing contract. The decision of the committee determined the relative
seniority rights of the employees of two companies, Dealers ...and
E & L ....-80

As a result of legitimate business exigencies, E &L agreed to withdraw in favor of Dealers from the business of transporting new automobiles and trucks from the Ford Motor Company assembly plant at
Louisville, Kentucky. This agreement was one portion of a more general adjustment of markets between the two companies and no exchange or sale of property was involved in this aspect of the transaction.
After E &L withdrew, the amount of business conducted by Dealers
decreased from the combined amount that had been conducted by the
two companies in the Louisville market prior to the transaction; concomitantly there was a contraction in the total number of available
jobs.
The employees of both companies were represented by the same
union, Local 89 of the General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers
[Teamsters]. Its president, understanding "that the transaction between the companies involved no trades, sales or exchanges or property
but only a withdrawal by E &L at the direction of the Ford Motor
Company ... advised the E &L employees that their situation was
precarious. When layoffs at E &L began three E &L employees filed
grievances claiming that the seniority lists of Dealers and E &L should
be 'sandwiched' and the E &L employees taken on at Dealers with
the seniority they had enjoyed at E &L."8 1 These grievances were
processed, but the Dealers employees were advised by the local president or his assistant that they had nothing to fear "since the E &L
employees had no contract right to transfer under these circumstances."

82

As a result of inclusion within a single multi-employer, multi-local
union bargaining unit, almost identical collective agreements, a number
of whose provisions concerned seniority, 8 had been executed by both
Dealers and E &L. Under this agreement, disputes were to be settled
80 84 Sup. Ct. at 365.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83
"According to Art. 4, § 1 of the contract 'seniority rights for employees shall
prevail' and 'any controversy over the employees' standing on such lists shall be submitted to the joint grievance procedure .. "' 84 Sup. Ct. at 365-66.
Art. 4, § 5 provided:
In the event that the employer absorbs the business of another private,
contract or common carrier, or is a party to a merger of lines, the seniority
of the employees absorbed or affected thereby shall be determined by mutual
agreement between the Employer and the Unions involved. Any controversy
with respect to such matter shall be submitted to the joint grievance procedure.
Id. at 366.
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pursuant to a multi-staged grievance procedure. 84 Resort was made
to each higher stage if a settlement was not reached on the lower one.
In this case, the local joint committee deadlocked over the E & L
employees' grievance, and endorsed it, over the signature of the local
president and the Dealers representative, and referred it to the Joint
Conference Committee, the appellate board. Before that committee,
having, according to the Court, been more fully advised as to the
nature of the Dealers-E & L transaction, the local president supported
the position of the E &L employees. The Court further found that
the Dealers employees were represented at the hearing before the
Joint Conference Committee by three shop stewards who, just prior
to the hearing, were informed of the local president's new position by
the union. After a full hearing, the Joint Conference Committee
accepted the view of the E &L employees and determined that in
accordance with the provisions of the contract the E & L and Dealers
employees should "be sandwiched in on master seniority boards using
the presently constituted seniority lists and the dates contained there-

in

. . ':85
"

As a consequence of this decision, a large number of Dealers employees were to be laid off "to provide opening for E & L drivers" with
greater seniority.88 Moore, an aggrieved Dealers employee, brought a
class action against the union and Dealers in a Kentucky state court,
to enjoin the execution of the Joint Conference Committee's decision
or, in the alternative, to recover damages. Allegations were made to
the effect that the union had breached its duty of fair representation,
by fraudulently deceiving the Dealers employees, by conniving with
the E & L employees and by essentially failing to represent the Dealers
employees at all before the Joint Conference Committee. It was further
alleged that "The decision of the Joint Conference Board was . . .
84

Grievances were first to be taken up between the employer and the local union;
next they were to be submitted to the local joint committee where the union and employer are equally represented. The last stage in the grievance procedure itself was consideration by "the Automobile Transporters Joint Conference Committee upon which
the employers and the unions in the over-all bargaining had an equal number of representatives." The contract made it quite clear that the Joint Conference Committee had
jurisdiction to hear "all matters pertaining to the interpretation of any provision of [the]
Agreement, whether requested by the Employer or the Union ...." If it was able to
make a decision, "after listening to testimony of both sides," its decision was to be
"final and conclusive and binding upon the employer and the union, and the employees
involved." In the event the Joint Conference Committee was unable to come to a
decision on a dispute, provision was made for arbitration. Id. at 366.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
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arbitrary and capricious, contrary to existing practice in the industry

and violative of the collective bargaining contract." s
Seemingly deciding the issues under state substantive law, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that the contract provision relied

upon by the Joint Conference Committee was inapplicable and that
the decision of the committee was therefore not binding. The court

further concluded that in the circumstances of the case, representation of the two antagonistic interests by a single advocate, the union
(which had, according to the court, an interest of its own-enhancement of union power), rendered the committee's decision invalid as
being "arbitrary and violative of natural justice." 88 In an opinion by

Justice White, the Supreme Court took a somewhat different view of
the case.
In the first place, while agreeing that this was "an action to enforce
a collective bargaining contract," 89 the Supreme Court held that the
issues raised, although justiciable in the state courts, were to be decided strictly according to federal, not state law.90

The Court construed the pleadings to raise what would appear
to be two claims: First, a direct cause for breach of the collective

bargaining agreement and second, a cause for violation of the duty of
fair representation.

Specifically the Court said:
First, Moore challenges the power of the parties and of the Joint
Conference Committee to dovetail seniority lists of the two companies
because there was no absorption here within the meaning of section
5 of article 4 [see note 83, supra] and because, as the court below held,
7 Id. at 367.
88 356 S.W.2d 246. A similar conclusion was reached by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp. supra note 75. There, in a seniority dispute that
went to arbitration, the union had adopted one group of employees' position while rejecting that of another group. Despite the fact that the other group's interest coincided
with that of the employer, and consequently was represented by the employer, the court
held that the union, since it could not represent both groups simultaneously, had, as a
matter of law, breached its duty of fair representation. 8 Wis. 2d 272, 99 N.W.2d 136137. The remedy imposed by the court compelled the collective parties to allow the
"unrepresented" employees to participate themselves in the arbitral process. 8 Wis. 2d
275, 99 N.W.2d 138. There has been extensive comment on this decision. See e.g., Aaron,
Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22 Omo ST. L. REv. 39,
50-54 (1961); Note, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 115 (1960); Note, 58 Mic. L. REv. 796 (1960);
Note, 13 STAN. L. REv. 161 (1960); Note, 46 VA. L. REv. 802 (1960); Note, 1960 Wis.
L. REv. 324.
89 84 Sup. Ct. at 367.
10Id. at 369. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1961); Local
174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1961); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See also supra notes 29, 36.
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that section granted no authority to deal with jobs as well as seniority.
His position is that neither the parties nor the committee has any
power beyond that delegated to them by the precise terms of section
5. Since in his view the Joint Committee exceeded its power in
making the decision it did, the settlement is said to be a nullity and
his impending discharge a breach of contract.
Second, Moore claims the decision of the Committee was obtained
by dishonest union conduct in breach of its duty of fair representation and that a decision so obtained cannot be relied upon as a valid
excuse for his discharge under the contract. 91
According to the Court, however, both claims were based upon alleged
breaches of the collective agreement for it held that as to both complaints the action was "one arising under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act"9 2 which provides that:
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce... may be brought in any district court of the United States
in
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
93
controversy or without respect to the citizenship of the parties.
The reasoning employed by the Court to support its holding that
the fair representation claim involved an action to enforce the collective agreement is especially interesting in that it seems an attempt to
limit this conclusion to the particular facts at hand. The Court intially
held that the allegations of specific union misconduct were "sufflcient
to charge a breach of duty by the union in the process of settling the
grievances at issue under the collective bargaining agreement."9 4 It
did not thereupon say that it followed that the suit was one for breach
of the agreement. The Court found it necessary first to implicate the
employer in the wrong doing. The relationship of the alleged breach
of the duty to the Joint Committee's decision and the employer's action
was considered. Allusion was then made to the fact that half of the
members of the Joint Committee were affiliated with the international
union. Next the Court commented that while no fraud was alleged
91 Id. at 367-68.
at 368-69.
0 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (emphasis added). By this holding the
Court was able to avoid the question whether a violation of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice under the LMRA and therefore within the exclusive
primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Gormon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962); Ex parte
George, 371 U.S. 72 (1962). This is because "even if it is, or arguably may be, an
unfair labor practice, the complaint here alleged that Moore's discharge would violate
the contract and was therefore within the cognizance of federal and state courts, Smith
84 Sup. Ct. 369.
v. Evening News Ass'n, [371 U.S. 195 (1962)] ....
94 Id. at 368.
92Id.
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against the employer, the implication to be drawn from the complaint
was that the employer was neutral or that "the employer considered
the dispute a matter for the union to decide." 5 Finally, the Court
observed that since the grievance award had not been implemented
at the time the suit was filed, the employer was on notice that the union
was charged with a breach of its duty in procuring the decision of
the Joint Committee. "In these circumstances," the Court held that
"the allegations of the complaint, if proved, would effectively undermine the decision of the Joint Committee as a valid basis for Moore's
discharge." 98 Only after the foregoing explanation did the Court conarising under section
clude that "for these reasons this action is one
97
Act."
Relations
Management
Labor
the
301 of
To the extent that this complicated explanation was motivated by
a desire to limit sharply the announced rule, it would appear that the
Court has failed in its task. The Court has taken facts that add up to
something like implied consent or implied ratification and found the
company to have been a party to the breach. Rare indeed will be
the case in which a willing court could not find similar implications
of employer ratification. Furthermore, in the course of criticizing the
bare holding that any claim for breach of the duty of fair representation could be supported as a cause of action under section 301 for
breach of a collective agreement, Justice Goldberg appropriately suggested that it is more difficult to treat the fair representation claim
as one for "breach of the collective bargaining contract.., where, as
here, 'no fraud is charged against the employer'." 98 Surely, under the
Court's reasoning, if subsequent contract administration cases were
to involve not merely allegations of implied ratification but allegations
of active employer collusion in the union's breach of its fiduciary duty,
jurisdiction would also be properly invoked under section 301. It
would appear that only by clear opposition to the union position would
an employer be reasonably certain of avoiding implication in the
union's alleged breach of its duty and thereby possibly keeping the
grievant from making his fiduciary obligation suit sound in contract.
But this is not necessarily inappropriate. If given reasonable notice of
employee dissent from the union position, a "neutral" or "colluding"
employer should not be able to rely upon the contract interpretationit has been warned. On the other hand, if the employer truly opposes
the union's position and, presumably, supports that of the dissident
95ibid.
96 Ibid.

97 Id. at 368-69.
98 Id. at 375.
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employee, hardly more can be expected of the employer. If the union
prevails in arbitration or, because of economic power, in grievance
negotiation, it is not the company's fault. Besides, the employee can
still proceed against the union. Perhaps the company should be able
to rely upon such a contested collective determination, subject, however, to the possibility that in many cases the aggrieved employee
should be personally represented in the grievance and arbitration proceedings,0 9 and subject further to the fact that the relief sought by
the grievant, such as reinstatement, may be ineffective unless the employer can be joined. 10 0
After concluding that the plaintiff was properly in court, the Supreme Court then held that he had failed to prove his case.
Although holding that both claims stated a cause of action under
section 301, in passing on the merits of the complaint, the Court faced
separately the questions whether the facts demonstrated that the collective agreement had been breached because the grievance determination was ultra vires its terms and whether the union had violated
its duty of fair representation with the consequence that the collective
agreement had been breached.
First the Court addressed the question whether the Joint Conference Committee's decision was in violation of or unauthorized by the
collective agreement and was therefore invalid. In disposing of this
question, the Court did not squarely resolve the plaintiffs' contention
that collective parties are limited, in grievance proceedings, by the

precise terms of the existing agreement. Instead, it reviewed the Joint
Committee's actual construction of the agreement and held that the
decision of the Joint Committee was not in violation of any of its provisions and its action was in fact empowered by the agreement.' 0 1
The implication that can be drawn from the Court's approach is that

the parties are bound by their prior existing agreement. In Justice
09 See, e.g., Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., supra note 75 (discussed supra note 88);
Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963); Summers, Individual
Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362 (1962); contra,
e.g., In re Soto, 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 855, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1960).
1o Professor Blumrosen suggests that: "Agreements which violate the union's duty
of fair representation are voidable, and management may not rely on them. Thus, the
duty of fair representation is binding on the employer as well as on the union." Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control
of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 Mict. L. REv. 1435, 1493 (1963); see Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., supra note 90, at 203-04; Jenkins v. Win. SchluderbergT. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 (1958); but see Parker v. Boroch, 5 N.Y.2d
156, 161-62, 156 N.E.2d 297, 300, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 581 (1959); In re Soto, 7 N.E.2d
397, 400, 165 N.E.2d 855, 856, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282, 283-84 (1960).
101 84 Sup. Ct. at 369-71.
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Goldberg's view, this treatment of the issue was as much as a holding
to that effect.102
Having disposed of the first, or what may be called the true, contract action, the Court next considered whether the union's conduct
constituted a violation of its duty of fair representation. At the outset
the Court found that there was no "adequate support in this record
for the complaint's attack upon the integrity of the union and of the
procedures which led to its decision" 0 3 and that there was "insufficient
proof of dishonesty or intentional misleading on the part of the
union."10 4 Then the Court rejected the view of the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky that the union's representation of two antagonistic interests (or more properly its failure or practical inability to represent
both interests simultaneously) rendered the Joint Committee's decision
invalid. Relying upon Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,'0 5 the Court held
that in grievance proceedings, just as in contract negotiation, there
is no "breach of the collective bargaining agent's duty of fair representation in taking a good faith position contrary to that of some individuals whom it represents nor in supporting the position of one group
of employees against that of another,"106 for,
Just as a union must be free to sift out wholly frivolous grievances
which would only clog the grievance process, so it must be free to
take a position on the not so frivolous disputes. Nor should it be
neutralized when the issue is chiefly between two sets of employees.
Conflict between employees represented by the same union is a recurring fact. To remove or gag the union in these cases would
surely
07
weaken the collective bargaining and grievance processes.
By its separate treatment of plaintiff's two claims, the Court gave
the appearance that it was avoiding the suggestion that judicial inquiry
in fair representation cases may itself involve close consideration of
whether the union's position, if implemented, would on its face breach
the terms of the existing collective agreement. In this case, as in all
other such cases, the Court's basic inquiry, in determining whether
the union had breached its duty of fair representation, was whether
the union had taken a good faith position on the grievance. In so
proceeding, the Court has indicated that at all stages of collective bargaining the question of whether fair representation has been afforded
will generally depend upon judicial application of standards external
102

103

Id. at 373-74, quoted infra with note 110.
Id. at 371.

104 Ibid.
1o5

345 U.S. 330 (1952).

100 84 Sup. Ct. at 371.
107

Id. at 372.
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to the existing collective agreement. The Court did not, however,
necessarily imply that there could be no case in which such application of external standards would not itself require some consideration
of whether the union's decision, if implemented, would violate the
terms of the collective agreement. In the present case, it was unnecessary for the Court to resolve this question, for it was able to test
the grievance decision for fidelity to the collective agreement in the
course of resolving the other or true cause of action for breach of
contract.
Thus, although the majority opinion, unfortunately, wants for general clarity, one thing at least is clear: Once a binding collective agreement has been negotiated, subject employees are entitled to more
than just objectively non-invidiously discriminatory treatment by their
union. They can, at least in theory, insist upon their due under the
existing agreement. Here the contention that the grievance decision
was unauthorized by the agreement was, to be sure, not squarely
considered in the course of the Court's determination of the fair representation claim; it was decided separately. But even this fact of
separate consideration, which the Court did not label but which might
with care be conceptualized under a third party beneficiary theory,
reflects a significant enhancement of the apparent protection that
employees may invoke regarding contract administration. To the extent
of that enhancement, it is perhaps to engage in hair splitting to be
concerned with whether the task is performed within the sweep of
the fiduciary obligation claim or whether the courts must rather consider an independent cause of action for breach of contract.10 8 It is
possibly enough that the Court has adopted a public policy protective
of the individual and has demonstrated a willingness to examine the
contract in order to determine whether the interpretation by the collective parties has violated the employees' rights.
Goldberg, I. Dissenting (Concurring in the Result)
The majority's willingness to consider a breach of contract claim
that was independent of the fair representation claim provided the
first source of disagreement for Justice Goldberg, who was joined by
108 See Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A PreliminaryAnalysis,
9 BuFrA.o L. REv. 239, 240-41 (1960) (quoted in the text with note 25, supra). This
double-barreled approach may, however, make a difference in one respect. Section 301
is inapplicable to employees covered by the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. 49
Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958). Consequently,
it may be that employees subject to the Railway Labor Act will have less substantive
protection than those subject to the LMRA.
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Justice Brennan in a concurring opinion. 10 9 Justice Goldberg would

have ruled that the plaintiff could not state a cause of action for breach
of contract under section 301. He interpreted the majority's act in
reviewing and affirming the Joint Conference Committee's construction of the collective contract as essentially a holding "maling the

words of the contract the exclusive source of rights and duties" in
grievance proceedings. 1 ° Expressing great concern for the collective
interests in the continuing and unforseeably contingent collective bargaining process, he stated his opinion that "a mutually acceptable

grievance settlement between an employer and a union, which is what
the decision of the Joint Committee was, cannot be challenged by an
individual dissenting employee under section 301(a) on the ground

that the parties exceeded their contractual powers in making the settlement.""' Unlike arbitration where the arbitrator is bound by the

collective agreement, he contended that contract provisions do not
immutably bind the collective parties. Specifically in this case "The
presence of the merger-absorption clause did not restrict the right of
the parties to resolve their dispute by joint agreement applying, interpreting, or amending the contract."-12
Turning his attention to the Court's interpretation, or rather what
he considered to be its misinterpretation, of the duty of fair representation, Justice Goldberg stated that a claim for breach of that duty
could not "properly be treated as a claim of breach of the collective
bargaining contract supporting an action under section 301(a) . . .
particularly.., where, as here, 'no fraud is charged against the employer

."1"In part, Justice Goldberg's objection was also conceptual" 4
for, as he reminded the Court, the "duty [was] derived not from the
collective bargaining contract but [was] implied from the union s
109 Justice Douglas, concurring separately, agreed with Justice Goldberg's reasons
for concluding that the litigation was properly brought in the state court, but agreed
with the majority's reasons for concluding that on the merits no cause of action had been
made out. 84 Sup. Ct. 377.
Justice Harlan, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority
as to the true cause of action for breach of contract, but agreed with Justice Goldberg,
on the facts, that the fair representation cause in this case did not fall within section 301.
He further was of the opinion that the case should have been reversed and remanded
for careful consideration of whether the National Labor Relations Board had primary
jurisdiction over the unfair representation claim. 84 Sup. Ct. 377-78.
11o Id. at 374
111 Id. at 373. Justice Goldberg believed that this result was required under the
Court's earlier decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1952). See note
120 with text infra.
112 Id. at 374.
118 Id. at 375.
114 Id. at 376.
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rights and responsibilities conferred by federal labor statutes." 115 But
conceptually it is possible to contemplate that an alleged breach of
the statutory duty would also constitute a breach of the collective
agreement. It is, as well, not so very clear on the facts that the Court
was being unduly inconsiderate of a non-culpable employer's reliance
upon the original agreement or the grievance determination. Actually,
Justice Goldberg's real objection to the majority's treatment of the
subject is that, because of the way he views the social interests in
collective bargaining, he is of the opinion that a fair representation
inquiry should in no way be concerned with whether fairness has been
accorded pursuant to the standards to which the collective parties have
agreed in the existing collective agreement. Just as he rejected the
notion that under the first cause of action the contract provision might
"restrict the right of the parties to resolve their dispute by joint agreement applying, interpreting, or amending the contract,"""o he would
limit the duty of fair representation, at all stages of collective bargaining, to a proscription only of distinctions which are not based upon
" 117
differences "relevant to the authorized purposes of the contract,
without reference to what the individual may have legitimately expected under prior agreements or the prior existing contract. Thus,
on this level of policy, i.e., what rights should the individual have in
collective bargaining, Justice Goldberg insists that the two causes of
action cannot really be approached separately-and, as to each, he
would firmly strike a balance in favor of the collective parties and
flexibility.
Group v. Individual: A PartialConclusion
On balance, the majority's position, at least in substance if not in
conceptual formulation, represents a healthier judicial approach to the
total collective bargaining relationship than does Justice Goldberg's.
It is very easy to become so consumed with concern for flexible management of the collective enterprise that sight is lost of the legitimate
interests and expectations of the individual workers. It is easy as well
to lay captive to the idea that only through maximum enhancement of
group stability and decision can the interests of the individual workers
ever really be promoted. But the individual does exist apart from the
group and, to the extent that the provisions of the collective agreement
are clear, he should generally be able to rely upon and expect benefits
5Id. at 375.
116 Id. at 374.
117 Id. at 375-76, quoting from Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192,
203 (1944).
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that the group has promised him."' 8 Furthermore, acceptance of the
majority's policy choice does not mean that the group should or will be
overthrown with the resulting chaos, nor does it imply that the courts,
rather than the collective parties, should henceforth manage the collective relationship.
The majority's position contemplates, at most, that when the collective parties themselves have formalized some basic agreement, the
individual worker may then rely somewhat upon the specific provisions
of the agreement. This does not mean that legitimate collective interests are to be stymied by recalcitrant individuals, nor does it mean
that the individual can insist in court upon his interpretation of contract
provisions to the same extent that the union could insist upon its interpretation in negotiations with the employer. 119 The Court's decision
on the merits in Humphrey makes it clear, in fact, that only in the
unusual case will the collective parties be held, on judicial review of
the merits of a grievance determination, to have transgressed the
bounds of permissibility.
In circumstances involving contract ambiguities, or matters not
expressly covered by the existing agreement, or perhaps even matters
that, while apparently covered by the provisions, were not really anticipated or contemplated when the contract was negotiated, it can
realistically be expected that the actual scope of judicial review on
the merits will be essentially the same as it is during the contract drafting stages. In other words, to the extent that the substantive contract
provisions are flexible and the parties have provided procedurally for
mutual resolution of ambiguities and the like through the grievance
process, judicial review of the merits is really unchanged from the
contract drafting to the contract administration stage.
This limitation of review is quite necessary for
the collective agreement by which the individual and the collective parties are governed is not limited to the four corners of the
118 This, of course, is not to state a fact capable of empirical proof, nor does appreciation of the statement depend upon the particular labels the law may apply in promoting it. The statement is a value judgment made upon an assay, already undertaken here,
of the realities and needs of industrial life and upon an appreciation of the general social
interests in group-individual conflicts. See notes 1-79 supra, with text. As to the heightened interest of workers in grievance determinations see notes 64-69, supra, with text.
See also Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22 Omo ST.
L. REv. 39, 47-49 (1961) (suggestion that the employee may gain certain "vested" rights
under the collective agreement); Jaeger, Collective Labor Agreements and the Third
Party Beneficiary, 1 B.C. INn. & Com. L. REv. 125, 133 (1960); Silver, Rights of Individual Employees in the Arbitral Process, 12 N.Y.U. ANN. CoNp. LAB. 53, 55-57 (1959);
Note, 35 ST. Jom's L. REv. 85, 95 (1960).
119 Cf. Summers, supra note 99, at 396.
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written instrument. It is the whole agreement, including industrial
customs, established practices, understandings and precedents which
infuse the contractual words with life and meaning. The collective
agreement inevitably includes incomplete terms and unresolved ambiguities; and the individual's rights, like those of
the collective
120
parties, are subject to these gaps and uncertainties.
It does not even follow from the Humphrey decision that the collective
parties will be absolutely prohibited from frustrating the individual
when he appears to have a very clear contract right. In an earlier
case, the Court in fact held that a union could agree to an amendment
of a collective bargaining agreement that impairs rights recognized
under the old agreement without violating its duty of fair representation.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,12 ' the union and the company
formally amended the collective agreement to modify its seniority
provisions in order to give some new advantage to returning war veterans. In a suit brought by employees whose seniority under the old
contract thereby suffered, the Supreme Court held for the union. It
treated the question as if it were simply one involving initial contract
negotiation, without regard to the possibility that the grievants' rights
may have vested under the original agreement or that legitimate expectations were being defeated. That is, to determine whether there
had been a breach of the duty of fair representation, the Court applied
the test of whether, according to standards wholly external to the
contract, the union's decision was based upon "relevant differences"
with the burdens of proof and persuasion being placed on the plaintiffs.
The majority in the Humphrey case treated the fair representation
claim, but not the true contract cause, as being controlled by Huffman. 22 In Justice Goldberg's opinion, the true contract cause should
also be controlled by Huffman. His position was that under no legal
theory were the collective parties to be bound by the terms of the
existing collective agreement from modifying it by means of a mutually
acceptable grievance determination. In his opinion, the only distinction between the two cases was that in Humphrey the contract was
allegedly modified in the course of a grievance determination, i.e., by
application and interpretation, whereas in Huffman, the contract was
modified by the negotiation of a formal amendment. To Justice Goldberg this distinction does not make a legal difference.1 23 But, notwithstanding Justice Goldberg's objection, the law should take account of
120 Ibid. See notes 71-73 supra with text.
121345 U.S. 330 (1952).
122 See notes 101-107 supra with text.
12384

Sup. Ct. 374-76.
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the distinction between formal negotiations to amend a contract or
draft a new one, where it is clear to all that something new or different
is to result, and grievance negotiations applying or interpreting the
existing contract, where the new result may be passed off not as a
modification but as an extension of the old agreement. 1 24 Moreover,
Justice Goldberg ignores the fact that there is yet another distinction
to be drawn between the cases. In Humphrey two causes of action
were raised, fair representation and true breach of contract; in Huffman no question was raised of a possible breach of contract giving rise
to jurisdiction under section 301. This was probably because section
301 had questionable status when Huffman was decided. A couple
of years after Huffman, in fact, the Court decided that section 301
would not support an action either by an individual worker or on
behalf of his personal contract rights. 1 25 Although slowly26eroded, it
was only recently that this rule was expressly overturned.
124 Professor Summers has presented, in a somewhat different context, cogent reasons
why change by formal amendment differs significantly from modification by grievance
determination:
IT]he collective parties can change the general rules governing the terms
and conditions of employment, either by negotiating a new agreement or by
formally amending the old. The individual has no right to have the contract
remain unchanged; his right is only to have it followed until it is changed by
proper procedures. Although contract making (or amending) and contract
administration are not neatly severable, they are procedurally distinct processes.
Most union constitutions prescribe the method of contract ratification, and it is
distinct from grievance settlement; the power to make and amend contracts is
not placed in the same hands as the power to adjust grievances. [n.145: Many
union constitutions require that all collective agreements be approved by the
international union, some create special committees or conferences to negotiate and approve agreements and a substantial number require ratification by
membership votes. National Industrial Conference Bd., Handbook of Union
Government Structure and Procedures 49-54 (1955). In contrast, grievance
settlements, particularly at the lower steps, are commonly made by the local
officers or shop stewards.] Indeed, many union constitutions expressly bar any
officer from ratifying any action which constitutes a breach of any contract.
Through the ability to change the agreement, the collective parties retain a
measure of flexibility. They are not free, however, to set aside general rules for
particular cases, nor are they free by informal processes to replace one general
rule with a contrary one.
Summers, supra note 99, at 396-97. See note 69 supra; cf. Blumrosen, The Worker and
Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union
Relationship, 61 MicH. L. REv. 1435, 1475-76 (1963); cf. generally notes 53-70 infra,
with accompanying text.
125 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
348 U.S. 437 (1955).
126 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), overruling Association of
Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., supra note 125; see
General Drivers, Local 89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517 (1963); Summers, supra note 99,
at 370-75. Recent discussions of the development of jurisdiction under section 301 include: Comment, 49 Co~rNELL L.Q. 81 (1963); Comment, 42 ToAus L. Rev. 214 (1963).
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To the extent that the Court intended to keep the two causes of
action in Humphrey separate, its prior decision in Huff man had no
binding effect on its Humphrey holding as to the true contract cause
while, on the other hand, all suits for breach of the fiduciary duty of
fair representation are, evidently, to be fully limited by the Huffman
statement of the scope of protection. Yet, under both causes, the crux
of the individual's complaint is that he thinks that he has been deprived
of his contract rights. And, as Justice Goldberg implies, since the social
question of group interest versus individual interest does not differ
from one cause of action to the other, this compartmentalized conceptualization is inappropriate. He further contends, however, that both
causes should be governed by the Huffman rule, with the consequence
that the true contract cause be ruled non-existent.1 7 Justice Goldberg
may be correct in his implication that drawing substantial differences
between the two causes of action may prevent formulation of a consistent judicial approach in this realm. But, a more satisfactory step
toward consistency would be a re-evaluation by the Court of Huffman,
limiting its force in fair representation suits to the formal contract
making or amending processes. Since it can be expected that the true
contract cause is to be limited generally to allowing judicial review of
the merits of only collective actions undertaken during the administrative stage of collective bargaining, 12 8 the scope of protection under
both causes of action would therefore be essentially coincidental.
Under the Humphrey true contract cause of action it is possible
that if an individual seems rather clearly entitled to X under the collective bargaining agreement, he may not, in all save perhaps extreme
cartoon cases, be deprived of X in the course of the administrative
phase of collective bargaining. Such an approach might be an unfortunate judicial overcompensation, giving the individual more than his
proper due. It might moreover lead to overly stringent judicial supervision of the merits of administrative collective bargaining. To the
extent that judges are to review the merits of collective bargaining
decisions, it might be more appropriate for the Court to use its decision
in Humphrey as something like a device to shift the burden of proof.
That is, Humphrey might be interpreted to mean that when an individual's contract right appears rather clear, the union (or the collective parties) will be required to persuade the reviewing court that
the deviation from the contract terms was necessary or compelled by
very substantial consideration, not that it was reasonable or that it
127

See notes 109-12 supra with text.

128 See note 124 supra with text.
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had some rational basis.1 29 In other words, once the aggrieved indi-

vidual presents a clear claim under the collective agreement, the burden of proof-both of going forward and persuading-would shift to
the union or to the collective parties.

30

Substantive or ProceduralRights: Public Policy and
Private Ordering-BriefComments
Under the alternative interpretations of the Humphrey decision
as to the true contract cause of action, there is a danger that reviewing
courts will be either too stringent or too lax in protecting individual
interests. The scope of judicial review could fluctuate, depending in
part upon the particular judge or court, between the original Huffman
rule and the absolutely vested interest approach. Moreover, there
obviously can be a very broad range of judicial opinion as to whether
a particular aggrieved individual's right is sufficiently clear under the
existing collective agreement to warrant enforcement. The foregoing
is only illustrative of the great danger run when judicial review of the
merits of collective bargaining is expanded beyond minimum review
to assure against caprice or invidiousness as determined according to
general societal standards of fairness. The danger is that the courts
will exercise too much substantive supervision over the merits of collective bargaining decisions, thereby substituting public for private
ordering.131 It matters not that the collective parties may almost invariably be vindicated if they must carefully justify their actions in
court. The necessity of having collective decisions ratified by a public
agency in this manner is itself a significant burden as well as a continual demonstration of close and substantive public control.
Theoretically the collective parties must already persuade the
courts that their administrative determinations conform to the provisions of the existing collective bargaining agreement. In Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,'32 the Supreme Court held, well before

Humphrey, that suits for breaches of collective bargaining agreements
129 In Huffman, for example, the national statutory policy of favoring returning
military veterans was held to justify the collective parties' formal amendment of the
collective agreement. 345 U.S. at 339-42. Under the alternative interpretation of
Humphrey, this national policy might, as well, have justified modification of the collective agreement in a less formal fashion.
130 An approach similar to this was recently employed in the Fourth Circuit where

the court indicated that when the plaintiff has adduced direct and/or significant circumstantial evidence to the effect that the union's relevant reasons for discriminating
were pretextuous, the burden was then on the union both to present evidence and to
persuade the trier of fact that its reasons were not mere pretext. Thompson v. Brother-

hood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1963). See note 62 supra.
131 See notes 45-50 supra with text.
132 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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are to be entertained under section 301 and they are to be governed
on the merits by a federal common law of labor relations to be formulated by the courts. It might be said that in Humphrey all the Court
did was to extend the Lincoln Mills doctrine to include suits brought
by individuals, 13 but the extension is obviously very significant. Prior
to Humphrey the collective parties could generally avoid judicial intervention by privately resolving their disputes within the grievance
process or by providing for binding arbitration in the event the parties
themselves could not resolve their disagreement.-34 But, since individuals may now sue when aggrieved by administrative collective bargaining decisions, and thereby gain judicial review of these decisions,
the courts, despite the mutual efforts of the collective parties, may be
insinuated into a more real and general supervisory role.
If no satisfactory alternatives were available, to assure a proper
regard for the interests of the individual workers, this judicial role
might be accepted without further comment. But there is an alternative approach that, without completely negating the expansion of
judicial review of the merits, could minimize the necessity for its invocation. The proposal is that where the individual has a non-frivolous
interest in a grievance, not merely when his right under the collective
agreement appears rather clear, but also when the provisions are ambiguous or incomplete, the law should require that he be permitted
to appear and participate in the grievance and arbitral processes, if
his collective bargaining agent is unable, unwilling or neglects to represent his position. 13 5 To return to constitutional law analogies, the
133 See notes 125-26 supra.

34 See The Steelworkers Trilogy: United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
135 The proposition and the extensive debate generated by it are much more complicated than this formulation may itself appear. Careful examination of this realm of
possible response to the problems of group-individual conflict in collective bargaining
is beyond the scope of this article, concerned as it is with the substantive duties that
are owed the individual. A study of these matters will, however, be undertaken by the
author in an article to appear in the near future in an issue of the Maryland Law Review.
But it is worth noting now that much of the truly fruitful scholarly and judicial research
and colloquy on the subject of the individual's place in collective bargaining has been
conducted in terms of this proposition. See, e.g., materials, supra notes 88 & 99; Elgin,
Joliet, Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945); Brandt v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 55
L.R.R.M. 2665 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171 F. Supp. 782
(D. Md. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
859 (1960); Blumrosen, supra note 24, at 1465-501; Blumrosen, Legal Protection for
Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13
Ru'rcrns L. REv. 631 (1959); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REV.
601 (1956); Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 LAB.
L.J. 850 (1957); Dunau, Employee Participationin the Grievance Aspect of Collective
Bargaining, 50 CoLum. L. Ruv. 731 (1950); Gray, The Individual Worker and the
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alternative or supplementary proposal is to assure to the individual

procedural, as distinguished from substantive, due process of law. By
this approach, rather than to prescribe the substance of collective

decisions, the law prescribes something of the form to be followed
in reaching decisions. With the law concerned more with procedural
regularity than substance, less risk is run of substituting public for
private order. The individual, who "has no right to have the contract
remain unchanged, " 1 3 6 is assured fair consideration of his position and

interest, while the collective parties are assured needed flexibility without any unfortunate appearance of unfairness being an incident to
their deliberations. Of course, regardless of how fair a grievance pro-

ceeding might appear, the law would still not permit the collective
parties to implement substantively unfair, e.g., arbitrary, invidious or
capricious, determinations. If disputes were to be taken to neutral
arbitration, however, with participation there by aggrieved employees,

the occasion for judicial review of the merits would be even less frequent, since it is now clear that there is to be only minimal substantive
judicial review of arbitration decisions.'37
In Humphrey the Court indicated, again over Justice Goldberg's

objection, that it is receptive to this approach. A final question considered by the majority was whether the aggrieved Dealers employees
were "deprived of a fair hearing by having inadequate representation
at the hearing" before the Joint Conference Committee, since the union
opposed their position.138 The Court implied that in circumstances
such as those before it, where the union could not possibly represent
all the conflicting views of contending employees, there may be some
requirement, under the duty of fair representation, of adequate notice
and representation, for the dissident employees, at the grievance proceeding. The Court did not define the scope of such a requirement.

It did note, however, that the Dealers employees had notice of the
hearing, were aware of the controversy and were in fact represented
at the hearing, at union expense, by three stewards who "were given
Right to Arbitrate, 12 LAB. L.J. 816 (1961); Hanslowe, The Collective Agreement and
the Duty of FairRepresentation, 14 LAB. L.J. 1052 (1963); Hanslowe, Individual Rights
in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CoRm'Nu L.Q. 25 (1959); Lenhoff, The Effect of
Labor Arbitration Clauses Upon the Individual, 9 Aim. J. 3 (1954); Sherman, The
Individual and His Grievance-Whose Grievance Is It?, 11 U. Prrr. L. REv. 35 (1949);
Silver, supra note 118; Summers, supra note 108; Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agreement--A Comparison of Swedish and American
Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421 (1963); Report, supra note 8, 50 Nw. U.L. 1Etv. 143 (1955).
136 Summers, supra note 99, at 397 (quoted in full supra note 124).
137 See the Steelworkers Trilogy, supra note 134; Packinghouse Workers Local 721
v. Needham Packing Co., 32 U.S.L.W. 4202 (U.S. March 9, 1964); Textile Workers v.
Newberry Mills, Inc., 315 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1063), cert denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963).
138 84 Sup. Ct. at 372.
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every opportunity to state their position." 139 Observing that "the
Dealers employees made no request to continue the hearing until
they could secure further representation and have not yet suggested
what they could have added to the hearing by way of facts or theory
if they had been differently represented," the Court concluded that
there was no indication that a different presentation would have altered
the result. 140 This portion of the majority opinion no doubt induced
Justice Goldberg's statement that "trial-type hearing standards . ..
[should not] be applied so as to hinder the employer and the union
in their joint endeavor to adapt the 14collective bargaining relationship
to the exigencies of economic life." '
Protectionof Individuals and the Personal
Liability of Union Officials
To the extent that, under the doctrines of true contract breach and
fair representation, unions are required to observe decent behavior
and adhere to "wholesome principles of trusteeship" 142 in representing
workers in collective bargaining, the officer[s], agent[s], shop steward[s], or other representative[s]" 43 of unions are obligated as well to
conform to the court announced standards. In collective bargaining,
after all, a union can only act through the individuals who make up
its officialdom or its bureaucracy. Consequently, if the union is required to give the workers fair representation, the union's officials
must perform this obligation and presumably will be bound by any
judicial orders requiring specific acts to promote the union's duty.
Even if this obligation on the part of union officials did not necessarily follow from the existence of the obligation on the part of the
union, it is now very likely that union officials are specifically required
by statute to act, in collective bargaining, pursuant to a personal fiduciary obligation. By section 501(a) of the LMRDA, "Fiduciary Responsibility of Officers of Labor Organizations," Congress has provided
that:
1s9 Ibid.
140
141

Ibid. (emphasis added).
Id. at 377.

(Jackson and Frankfurter,
142 Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 68 (1947)
J. J.,
dissenting on other grounds).
143 LMRDA § 3(q), 73 Stat. 521 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 402(q) (Supp. IV, 1963):
[W:hen used with respect to a labor organization, [each term] includes
elected officials and key administrative personnel, whether elected or appointed
(such as business agents, heads of departments or major units, and organizers
who exercise substantial independent authority), but does not include salaried
nonsupervisory professional staff, stenographic, and service personnel.
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The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a
labor organization occupy positions of trust in relationto such organization and its members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each
such person, taking into account the special problems and functions
of a labor organization,to hold its money and property solely for the
benefit of the organization and its members and to manage, invest,
and expend the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws
and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder,
to refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse party
or in behalf of an adverse party in matters connected with his duties
and from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest
which conflicts with the interests of such organization,and to account
to the organization for any profit received by him in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him or under his
direction on behalf of the organization. A general exculpatory provision in the constitution and bylaws of such a labor organization or a
general exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to
relieve any such person of liability for breach of the duties declared
by this section shall be void as against public policy. 4
Under section 501(b), upon the failure of the union to move with
reasonable dispatch against an erring official, any "member may sue
such officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in any district court
of the United States or in any State court of competent jurisdiction
to recover damages, or secure on accounting or other appropriate
relief for the benefit of the labor organization. [But] No such proceeding shall be brought except upon leave of the court obtainedupon
verified application and for good cause shown, which application may
be made ex parte." 14 5 Rather than belonging personally to the plaintiff,
the suit under section 501 is very like a "stockholder's derivative
action."14(

Professor (now Solicitor General) Cox has nevertheless described
Stat. 535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501(a)
Stat. 535 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 501(b)
Provision is made in this subsection for allotment
recovery to compensate the complaining member
144 73

145 73

(Supp. IV, 1963) (emphases added).
(Supp. IV, 1963) (emphasis added).
by the trial court of a portion of any
for counsel fees and other "expenses

necessarily paid or incurred by him in connection with the litigation." See Comment, 73
YALE L.J. 443 (1964).
Section 501(c), 73 Stat. 536, 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (Supp. IV, 1963), provides
criminal sanctions of imprisonment and fine for embezzlement, theft, and the like, by

union officials.
146 Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 297-99 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 325 F.2d 646
(8th Cir. 1963); see Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform
Act of 1959, 58 MicH. L. REv. 819, 828 (1960); Dugan, Fiduciary Obligations Under
the New Act, 48 GEo. L.J. 277, 279 (1959); Wollett, Fiduciary Problems Under Landrum-Griffin, 13 N.Y.U. ANN. CoNF. LAB. 267, 270 (1960); cf. Note, 51 YALE L.J. 331,
333 (1941).
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this section as "potentially the most important" in the entire LMRDA. 147
He further reports that "The principles stated in section 501(a) were
drawn from the Restatement of Agency in an effort to incorporate the
whole body of common law precedents defining the fiduciary obligation of agents and trustees with such adaptations as might be required

to take into account 'the special problems and functions of a labor
organization .... . "148
While the main thrust of this section is obviously to assure against

financial misfeasance on the part of union officials, it has become clear
that the provision encompasses much more than this. The courts have
adopted a generous view of the scope of the provision, so generous

that one district court has interpreted it to mean that "The duties are
thus as broad as human experience in the labor field." 49 And the
court of appeals in affirming this determination held that section 501
"imposes fiduciary responsibility in its broadest application and is not

confined in its scope to union officials only in their handling of money
and property affairs."1 5O No contrary judicial or scholarly opinion has
92 (1960). Accord, Aaron, The Labor1959,
73 HAv. L. R;v. 851, 894 (1960).
Management
Reporting and DisclosureAct of
14 8
Cox, supra note 49, at 828. (As to Solicitor General Cox" unique competence in
construing the Act, see Nelson v. Johnson, supra note 146, 212 F. Supp. at 300 n.69.)
See also, Dugan, supra note 146, at 297-301; Katz, Fiduciary Obligations of Union
Officers Under Section 501 of the Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 13 LAB. L.J. 542, 54648 (1963); Ostrin, Fiduciary Obligations of Union Officers:
A CriticalAnalysis of Section 501, in SYMosI M ON ThE LABoR-MANAGEMNT REPOrtTD7G AND DISCLOSurm AcT OF 1959 (Slovenko ed. 1961) 528, 534-37; Tarbutton, The
Fiduciary Responsibility of Officers of Labor Organizations Under the Common Law
and LMRDA, in S mosrlrm, supra 513; Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 486, 502-05 (1962).
149 Nelson v. Johnson, supra note 146, 212 F. Supp. at 240. After exhaustive review
of the relevant legislative history, id. at 284-96 (see generally NLRB, LEGIsLATVE
HISTORY OF ma LABOR-MANAGEmENT REPORTING AND DIScLosuan ACT OF 1959
(1959)), the court made the following conclusions as to its scope:
Congress was fed up with the discarded rights of the union member; Congress was incensed at the conduct of union officials unconcerned with the responsibilities of their office. Congress wished to stop the outrageous conduct of the
thugs and the gangsters, but Congress also wished to stop lesser forms of objectionable conduct by those in positions of trust. In the place of corruption, greed,
and large and small abuses of power Congress wished to substitute obedience
to a high standard of honor and loyalty to the union member whom the union
official was chosen to serve.
212 F. Supp. at 295.
Section 501 is no parsimonious dole by the Congress, to be niggardly measured
out by the Federal courts. Congress meant the remedy to be no less sophisticated than the problem-the cure to be co-extensive with the malady.
212 F. Supp. at 296.
As to additional examinations of the legislative history of § 501 see Druker, Fiduciary
Responsibility of Union Officials, in Symxosirum, supra note 148, at 519; Dugan, supra
note 146; Ostrin, supra note 148.
150 Nelson v. Johnson, supra note 146, 325 F.2d at 651.
147 Cox, LAw AND NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
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been noted, 151 and furthermore, it has been suggested that, in its great
breadth, the fiduciary duty under section 501 extends to the sphere of
collective bargaining. 1 52 This interpretation gains support from the congressional statement of findings, purposes and policy that: "it is essential that labor organizations... and their officials adhere to the highest
standards of responsibility and ethical conduct in administering the
affairs of their labor organizations, particularly as they affect labormanagement relations." 53 And one attorney, in fact, has already argued
to the Supreme Court that:
[Tlhe "broad declaration" of the fiduciary duty in section 501(a) is
not limited to "pecuniary matters" . . . . The legislative history...
makes clear that the... duty extends particularly to the collective
bargaining context. Section 501 was the congressional response to the
findings of the McClellan committee with regard to sweetheart contracts, discrimination against political opposition, "sellout" of locals
by international officials, and other abuses of official power, both large
and small. The section "is no parsimonious dole by the Congress," but
was intended to remedy all the mischief which it called forth .... -4
While it is probable that the fiduciary duty under section 501(a)
does extend to the collective bargaining context, the class of persons
protected under that section is more limited than the class protected
under the statutory duty of fair representation. This is because section
501(a) is limited to protection of "members" of the labor organization
employing the errant official, while "the duty of fair representation
derived from the union's statutory status as exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the bargaining unit, regardless of union
membership."' 5 5 Furthermore, the standards of fiduciary conduct de351 Judicial opinions generally in agreement with the Nelson view include: Parks v.
IBEW, 203 F. Supp. 288, 295, 308-10 (D. Md. 1962), reversed on other grounds, 314

F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963); Moshetta v. Cross, 48 L.R.R.M.
2669 (D.D.C. July, 1961). See also, Development in the Law, Judicial Control of Actions
of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REv. 983, 1003 n.51 (1963).
152 See Wollett, supra note 146, at 285-86. There is substantial support in the legislative history of the Elliott bill, which contained exactly the same fiduciary provision
as the LMRDA, for this interpretation. See H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
81-82; Statement of Representative Elliott, read by Representative Bolling, 105 CONG.
Rac. 14212-13 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1959).
153 LMRDA § 2(a), 79 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
154 Petition for Certiorari, p. 23, Parks v. IBEW, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).

255 Wollett, supra note 146, at 286. But cf. Givins, Enfranchisement of Employees

Arbitrarily Rejected for Union Membership, 11 LAB. L.J. 809 (1960); Givins, Federal
Protection of Employee Rights Within Trade Unions, 29 FoRDHAm L. REv. 259 (1960).

"Member" is defined in LMRDA § 3(o), 73 Stat. 521 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 402(o)
(Supp. IV, 1963):
"Member" ... includes any person who has fulfilled the requirements for membership in such [labor] organization, and who neither has voluntarily withdrawn
from membership nor has been expelled or suspended from membership after
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manded by section 501(a) are not likely to afford significantly more
protection-and may not even provide any additional protection-than
is already available to aggrieved workers under the duty of fair representation or pursuant to their ability to bring suits for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement. 58 In interpreting and applying section 501(a), the courts in fact have adopted substantially the approach
used in deciding cases of breach of the collective bargaining agreement. They have specifically taken the view that Congress intended
them
to fashion a new federal labor law in much the same way that the
federal courts have fashioned a new substantive law of collective
bargaining contracts under section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
[See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).] In undertaking this task the federal courts will necessarily rely heavily upon
the common law of the various states. Where the law is lacking or
where it in any way conflicts with the policy expressed in our national
labor laws, the latter will of course be our guide.
We turn to section 501, not expecting to find a detailed command
or prohibition as to the particular act complained of, but rather to
find a general guide which, properly developed, will lead us to an
answer. sr

To the extent that Humphrey v. Moore'5" may be indicative of the
kind of creative approach contemplated, it is highly unlikely, with
the federal courts thus left pretty much to their own devices, that
individuals will find substantive relief in the collective bargaining
context, under section 501, in any but clear cases of "sweetheart" contracts, fraud, particular malice or obdurate refusal by union officials
to obey court orders.
appropriate proceedings consistent with lawful provisions of the constitution
and bylaws of such organization.
Another possibly substantial limitation results from the fact that an aggrieved member must procure permission to sue, "for good cause shown," from the court. See § 501(b)
quoted in the text, supra, with note 145.
158 It is possible, as well, that to the extent the § 501(a) duty might overlap with
the employee's fair representation or contract breach remedies, the § 501 action would
be pre-empted. See LMRDA § 603, 73 Stat. 540, 29 U.S.C. § 523 (Supp. IV, 1963);
Wollett, supra note 146, at 286; cf. Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 107 v.
Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 612-14 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961); Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 443, 449 (1964).
157 Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 107 v. Cohen, supra note 156, 182 F.
Supp. at 617; accord Nelson v. Johnson, supra note 146, 212 F. Supp. 241-42; see materials cited note 148, supra. Comment on the sparse and confused state of the law regarding fiduciary duties in the field of labor relations, and the limitations of resort to analogy,
has been made by Wollett, supra note 146, at 276-77; Comment 73 YALE L.J. 443, 449-

52 (1964).
15884 Sup.

Ct. 363 (1964).
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There has, to date, been only one reported case in which a clear
holding was made as to the relation of section 501(a) to the collective
bargaining process. In that case, Parksv. IBEW,159 the Maryland federal district court concluded that, as a consequence of collusion with
employers and other presumed improper acts, some of which were
also performed in the course of collective bargaining, the president
of an international union had breached his fiduciary duty under section
501(a) to the members of a local union. This determination was reversed on appeal. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, dividing two
to one, while implying that some fiduciary duty might be owed under
section 501(a) in collective bargaining, accepted the district court's
findings of fact but ruled that the facts demonstrated no impropriety. 10 Close reading of the appeals court's decision makes it clear that
it engaged in a quest for a reasonable or rational basis for the international president's action much in the same fashion as, under the
Huffman test of fair representation, the courts seek to determine if
the union's action was unfair in the sense of being arbitrary, capricious
or invidious.161 Unless the Supreme Court rejects the fourth circuit
approach, it is clear that the scope of the fiduciary duty imposed in
collective bargaining on the individual official under section 501(a)
will be no broader than that already imposed on the union body pur62
suant to the duty of "fair representation."
Since the union official, as an agent of the union, and possibly in
his own right, is bound to accord the workers he represents "fair representation," it remains to be considered whether the protection of
the individual workers would be appropriately enhanced by the imposition of personal tort or other financial liability upon the union official.16 3 It is of course by now understood that such an official would
be subject to any injunction against the union and might himself, in
some circumstances, be enjoined.
A number of relatively early commentators and courts did, in fact,
propose that liability be generally imposed upon the particular union
official who had perpetrated the wrong against an aggrieved individual,
159 Parks v. IBEW, supra note 151, 314 F.2d 886.
160 Id., 314 F.2d at 925-26.
161 See id., 314 F.2d at 904-14.
162 The Supreme Court denied certiorariin Parks, supra note 151.
One recent commentator has indicated support of such a limited real scope for
section 501 in collective bargaining. Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 443, 449-50 (1964) (implied); cf. Katz, supra note 148, at 551-52, Wollett, supra note 146, at 281-83.
163 Of course where liability is imposed pursuant to "stockholders" derivative-like
action, see supra notes 142-62 with text, this inquiry is technically moot--except to the

extent that it may illuminate further consideration of what scope should be found for
use of § 501 as a protection in collective bargaining.
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rather than upon the union. 6 4 Such suggestions were based primarily
upon two considerations:
First, there was likely some anxiety lest the union's treasury and
its general effectiveness be sapped as a result of vexatious or even
justified suits. Since most suits by aggrieved individuals against unions
were brought by members or expelled members, who sought reinstatement as well as damages, it was thought to be in the plaintiff's
own interest to avoid injury to the union body. It was, consequently,
believed that the integrity of the union would be best preserved and
the individual best protected if the union were immunized from suit,
and liability were cast instead upon its erring agent.1 5
Second, there were conceptual difficulties that made it all but impossible for the union itself to be sued. The major difficulty was that
in the absence of statutes to the contrary, courts in most jurisdictions
held that a labor union was not an entity distinct from its membership
and, therefore, could not be sued in its own name or by a member. 0 6
Thus, to assure some protection for the aggrieved individual, suit was
held to lie against the union official through whom the union had
16
wrongfully acted. 7
These reasons for holding union officials personally liable are no
longer significant. First, national policy and the law has moved far in
the direction of holding unions to be entities for purposes of suit. 6S
This was, in fact, a basic reason for the passage of section 301 of the
LMRA;169 therefore entity problems no longer exist in suits by indi6

- Marchitto v. Central RR of New Jersey, 9 N.J. 456, 88 A.2d 851 (1952); Atkinson v. Thompson, 311 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (following Marchitto);
DeVillors v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A.2d 333 (1950); See Dusing v. Muzzo, 26
N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941); Order of Railway Conductors v. Jones, 78 Colo.
80, 239 Pac. 882 (1925); Chafee, Jr., Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43

HAIv. L. REv. 993, 1009-12 (1930); Note, 51 YALE L.J. 331 (1941).
165 See Chafee, Jr., supra note 164, at 1010-12; Developments in the Law, supra

note 151, at 1089-90.
160 UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385 (1922); Hromek v. Gemeinde,
238 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941); Saint v. Pope, 211 N.Y.S.2d 9, 12 A.D.2d 168
(App. Div. 1961); Marchitto v. Central R.R. of New Jersey, supra note 164, Atkinson
v. Thompson, supra note 164; DeVillars v. Hessler, supra note 164; Forkosch, Legal
Status and Suability of Labor Organizations,28 TEMPLE L.Q. 1 (1954).
167 See Marchitto v. Central R.R. of New Jersey, supra note 164; Atkinson v. Thompson, supra note 164; DeVillars v. Hessler, supra note 164.
168 See Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W.2d 782
(1960), limiting Kromek v. Gemeinde, supra note 166; Donnelly v. United Fruit Co.,
40 N.J. 60, 190 A.2d 825 (1963), overruling Marchitto v. Central R.R. of New Jersey,
supra note 164; Marshall v. International Longshoremen Local 6, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 22
Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P.2d 987 (1962); Comment, Unions as Juridical Persons, 66 YALE
L.J. 712 (1957); Developments in Law, supra note 151, at 1089-92.
169 Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 510-13 (1962).
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viduals for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 170 Furthermore, there has never been any difficulty in enforcing the federal duty
of fair representation in suits brought against unions in their own
names. 17 1 It has, indeed, recently been held by one court that a fair
representation suit cannot properly be brought against a union official,
for the claim will support only an action against the union. 7 2 Thus, in
reality unions are now themselves being sued by individuals with no
apparent crippling effect to their treasuries or to their general useful73
ness to the workers.1
Aside from the fact that there appears to be no need to hold the
union official himself liable, unless he willfully disregards a court order,
it is probably less inhibiting to union activity if the union rather than

the official stands responsible for damages that result from collective
bargaining wrongs. 7 4 An analogy might be drawn to the immunity

enjoyed by governmental officials, who are charged with administrative
discretion, from tort liability for acts performed within the scope of
their offices. 75 The reason for such immunity is that it is thought to

promote effective government and to avoid "dampen[ing] the ardor
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties."176 Just as "again and again the public
interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself bard put
170 Humphrey v. Moore, 84 Sup. Ct. 363 (1964).

See Steel v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Parker v. Borock,
5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1959); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW,
400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960).
172 Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, supra note 171, 400 Pa. at 172-73, 161 A.2d at 896:
The fiduciary duty owed the member-employee is by the Union, and not by its
individual representatives. Officials of the Union, acting in their authorized
capacities, cannot be held liable in damages to a member-employee for failure
to process a grievance since they are but agents responsible only to the Union
itself. It is the Union that is the proper target of appellant's complaint.
See Nobile v. Woodward, 200 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (impliedly limiting Faisetti
to state causes of action and not necessarily those arising under the Railway Labor Act.)
173 In 1957 the income of labor unions in the United States reached about $620,000,000. 187 EcONOMIST 703 (1958). As to union finances in 1959-1960 see U.S. Dep't
of Labor, BLRM, UNION FiNANcrAL STATIsTics: 1959-1960. See also, Applebaum,
Financial Structure and Characteristicsof Labor Organizationsin a Metropolitan Area,
15 LAB. L.J. 30 (1964).
74
1 See Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 443, 449-50 (1964); cf. Katz, supra note 148, at
552; Wollett, supra note 146, at 281-83.
175 See generally, 3 DAvis, AmiIsv-aAa-rvn LAw § 26.01 (1958); Gray, Private
Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REv. 303 (1959); James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Car. L. BEv. 610 (1955).
' 76 Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
949 (1950); see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
'7
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to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith," 177 the interest of the workers
and the collective parties often calls for action in the administration
of the collective agreement which may turn out to be wrong or im-

proper and which the union official would "be hard put to it to satisfy
a [court] of his good faith."178 And just as "there must indeed be means
of punishing public officials who have been truant to their duties,"
other than by laying them open to tort suit, 7 9 other means, e.g., resort

to internal political processes, should generally be employed to punish
truant union officials. 18 0

Conclusion
It is difficult to call this a conclusion for so far as the law is concered, especially the law in public realms such as labor relations,
there are no conclusions in the sense of even reasonably final answers-there really are only ways of approaching or temporarily

solving problems. The questions considered here dealt with groupindividual conflict, and particularly as. to such questions there are

no final solutions. Yet, however limited or unclear the substantive
protection that individuals may be able to expect pursuant to sec-

tion 501 and to the doctrines of fair representation and contract
breach, these are useful vehicles for the continual examination of the
tensions between group and individual in collective bargaining. Perhaps a better legal accommodation could be achieved by stressing
procedural rights rather than these substantive obligations. The pro-

cedural approach of course has the virtue of minimizing public control
and scrutiny of the merits of collective decisions. But, in the hands
of careful and responsive judges, the fiduciary and contract breach
approaches can provide useful alternatives or at least supplemental
means of assuring the individual some safety from group power while
a proper regard is maintained for the primacy, if not quite all the

desired privacy, of the collective relationship.
177

Gregoire v. Biddle, supra note 176, at 581.
See materials cited supra, note 174.

178 Ibid.
179

Ibid.

180 See Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, supra, note 171, 400 Pa. at 172-73, 161 A.2d

at 896 (quoted supra note 172).
To the extent that § 501 of the LMRDA is applicable, suit will of course lie against
the union officials for damages to be paid to the union. See § 501(b) supra note 145
with text. In the light of the foregoing, it becomes all the more persuasive that invocation
of § 501 in collective bargaining should be limited to rather clear cases of fraud, corruption, and actual malice. See supra notes 156-62 with text. The courts might achieve
this result by refusing to certify that other suits invoking § 501 in collective bargaining
are brought "for good cause shown," see § 501(b), supra note 145 with text, or by more
formally adopting a narrow construction of section 501 in this area.

